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Abstract 
Ambivalent and Dual Attitudes: Attitude Conflicts and their Impact on Decision Making 
and Behavior 
This dissertation builds on two recent developments in attitude research, frrst the 
distinction made between two types of attitudes, i.e., explicit (deliberate, controlled) and 
implicit (unconscious, automatic) attitudes, and second, that made between two types of 
attitude conflicts, i.e., ambivalence (conflict between strong explicit positive and negative 
evaluative basis of the same attitude object) and duality (conflict between explicit and 
implicit attitudes). It uses the context of food for both its theoretical and empirical 
developments because there were reasons to expect that, in Western cultures, explicit 
attitudes are often ambivalent (i.e. positive on taste but negative on health dimensions), 
but might also be dual (e.g. for restrained eaters, resulting from the motivated overriding 
of positive attitudes toward tempting but forbidden food). 
A first study (N = 199) focuses on the differences between ambivalent and dual 
attitudes and the influence of these conflicts on spontaneous and deliberate behavior. 
Results demonstrate that holding dual and ambivalent attitudes are two different 
constructs, although both ambivalence and duality lead to a subjective experience of 
conflict. Also, attitudes are weaker when ambivalent (i.e. less accessible, less stable and 
held with less certainty), and duality is a moderator at high levels of ambivalence, with 
explicit attitudes being even less accessible but nonetheless more certain when dual. 
Finally, the influence of, on one hand, both implicit and explicit attitudes in driving 
spontaneous choice and, on the other hand, the explicit attitude in detennining deliberate 
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choice (behavioral intention as proxy) is corroborated. It also appears that the influence of 
thé implicit attitude on spontaneous behavior is increased in presence of an attitude 
conflict. In a second study (N = 120), the hypothesis that the existence of dual attitudes 
stems from inhibitive processes is tested in the context of restrained eating, through a 
cognitive load manipulation. Results demonstrate that the influence of the implicit 
attitude on spontaneous choice is stronger for restrained eaters when cognitive capacities 
are impaired. The second study also highlights that implicit attitudes are stable and 
resistant to change despite direct experience manipulations (i.e. comparative and repeated 
tasting). Theoretical, methodological and practical contributions are discussed. 
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Résumé 
Ambivalence et dualité: les conflits attitudinaux et leur influence sur la prise de decision 
et le comportement 
Cette dissertation explore, au travers de deux études de laboratoire, le conflit dans 
les attitudes et leur impact sur les choix spontanés et délibérés, dans un contexte 
alimentaire. Une différence est introduite entre l'ambivalence (Le. être sciemment et 
simultanément positif et négatif envers un produit) et la dualité (i.e. avoir deux attitudes 
de valence différente, dont l'une, l'attitude explicite, est consciente et activée 
délibérément et une autre, l'attitude implicite, est inconsciente et automatique). L'étude 1 
(N = 199) explore les conséquences de ces deux conflits sur la force de l'attitude et sur le 
comportement. Particulièrement, les résultats démontrent une influence conjointe de 
l'attitude implicite et explicite sur le choix spontané alors que seule l'attitude explicite 
détermine le choix délibéré. De plus, l'influence de l'attitude implicite est amplifiée 
lorsque un conflit existe (ambivalence ou dualité). L'étude 2 (N = 120) s'attache à 
expliquer le mécanisme conduisant à l'existence d'une attitude implicite et inconsciente, 
et à la dualité, par un phénomène d'inhibition. L'hypothèse est testée dans le contexte de 
participants qui suivent des régimes amaigrissants de façon chronique. Dans des 
conditions d'accès restreint à leurs capacités cognitives, ce groupe de participants a plus 
de difficultés à contrôler son comportement. Le choix est alors plus fortement influencé 
par l'attitude implicite, en faveur d'un aliment enrichi contre un aliment appauvri en 
graisses. De plus, une manipulation visant à diminuer les conflits attitudinaux via une 
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expérience directe et répétée avec un aliment démontre que les attitudes implicites sont 
particulièrement résistantes à la persuasion. La contribution théorique; méthodologique et 
pratique de cette recherche est discutée. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A long standing tradition within consumer research focuses on the explicit, 
deliberative and volitional aspects of behaviour and decision making. For instance, 
Ajzen's theory ofreasoned action assumes that attitudes along side subjective nOnTIS and 
perceived behavioural control influence one' s intention, which in turn drives the 
behaviour (Ajzen, 2001). Within this deliberative approach, conflict has predominantly 
been studied as arising from trade-offs between the advantages and disadvantages of one 
product compared to an alternative. For instance, Luce (1998) and Luce, Bettman and 
Payne (1997)'s work focus on difficult decisions involving the use of controlled processes 
i.e. making trade-offs between attribute values of different alternatives (between-
alternative conflict; Luce, 1998; Luce, Bettman and Payne, 1997), which is the source of 
negative affect, or between attributes which are evaluatively distinct within a specific 
alternative (within-alternative conflict; Luce, lia and Fischer, 2003), which Ïncreases 
judgment uncertainty. AIso, in Wertenbroch and colleagues' research (Wertenbroch, 
1998; Dhar and Wertenbroch, 2000), conflict is operationalized from a cognitive 
perspective, as trade-offs between short-term benefits and long-term consequences of 
hedonic and utilitarian alternatives. Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999; 2002) opened up new 
avenues for research on conflict and decision making through studying the interplay 
between affect (heart) and cognition (head) in influencing choice behavior. Their research 
suggests that choices might follow from a cognitive route, involving deliberative 
processes but also an automatic route, involving less control. This dissertation builds on 
these foundations, by integrating the existence of two possible conflicts in attitude, one 
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derived solely from cognitive processes (i.e. ambivalent attitudes) and one based on the 
interplay between cognitive and automatic processes (i.é. dual attitudes). 
Ambivalence (i.e. the existence of inconsistent evaluations at the explicit level1) 
has received considerable attention since the 90' s, and the subjective experience of 
conflict and lack of consistency between ambivalent attitudes and behaviours are weIl 
documented. Yet, recently, Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler (2000)' s Madel of Dual 
Attitudes suggests another source of conflict, resulting from the coexistence in memory of 
two independent and antagonistic attitudes toward the same attitude object. The explicit 
attitude would be generated intentionally whereas the implicit one would be outside of 
awareness and control2• It is interesting to observe that, although both the ambivalence 
and implicit attitude paradigm originate from the same domain of research (Le. the study 
of prejudiced attitudes and behavior), and despite their obvious similarities in 
conceptualization (i.e. conflicting evaluations for the same attitude object), both lines of 
research have evolved in parallel, with no or few cross-over, except for a paragraph in 
Wilson et al. (2ooo)'s article suggesting different antecedents and consequences to 
ambivalent and dual attitudes. Particularly, in their view, ambivalence is based on 
endorsement of both conflicting evaluations whereas dual attitudes are the consequence 
of the overriding of a response considered illegitimate and its substitution with a "more 
wanted" response. 
1 For instance, a respondent might be both positive toward chocolate because it pro vides 
energy and negative with same intensity because it is bad for her diet. 
2 For instance, a respondent might declare being negative toward chocolate because it puts 
on weight and at the same time ignore (or repress) an automatic drive or craving for 
chocolate. 
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The research presented in this dissertation is, to our knowledge, the first to 
investigate differences and similarities, antecedents and consequences of ambivalent and 
dual attitudes. The field chosen for this research is food attitudes. Indeed, food choices 
often lead to volitional decisions that are inconsistent with spontaneous behaviours. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that certain populations (i.e. restrained eaters for 
instance) might experience dissociation between their implicit and explicit attitudes 
toward specifie food items. In addition, food attitudes are relatively free of self-
presentation bias, which eliminates a reason frequently invoked for the dissociation 
between implicit and explicit attitudes. Finally, ambivalence in food attitudes is weIl 
documented and food is traditionally used as target objects in the study of attitude conflict 
(e.g. Sparks, Hedderley and Shepherd, 1992; Povey, Welens and Conner, 2(01). 
The theoretical framework of this dissertation is exposed in the flfst chapter. It 
builds on recent research on the independence of positive and negative bases of 
evaluations as weIl as on the existence of implicit attitudes to conceptualize the 
differences between ambivalent and dual attitudes. Accordingly, hypotheses are presented 
on the influence of having ambivalent and dual attitudes on the subjective experience of 
conflict, strength of the explicit attitude and the interplay between implicit and explicit 
attitude on spontaneous and deliberate choice. These hypotheses are tested in a laboratory 
study involving a choice between chocolate and yoghurts as focal attitude objects. Results 
of this study are presented in the second chapter. A follow up study (chapter three) was 
designed in order to explore further the processes leading to holding dual attitudes. It is 
suggested that dual attitudes are the consequence of inhibitive processes, the implicit 
attitude being overridden and replaced by the explicit attitude. This hypothesis is tested in 
the context of restrained eating (Hennan and Polivy, 1980) which involves self-
Il 
regulation. Specifically, Baumeister (2002) refers to self-control or self-regulation as the 
"self' s capacity to alter its own states and responses. Thus, self-control overrides one 
incipient pattern of response and replaces it with another' (p. 670). Restrained eaters 
would tend to override an automatic response (e.g. temptation for high-fat products) and 
replace it with a competing response (e.g. bad for health) more instrumental to attain their 
goal (e.g. losing weight). Nonetheless, this group might not be able to repress their 
implicit attitude and its influence on spontaneous choice when under impairment of 
cognitive capacity. In addition, this second study investigates direct experience as a mean 
to change implicit and explicit attitudes and reduce attitude conflict. In the last chapter, 
results are discussed and the theoretical, methodological and practical contributions of 
this research are presented, together with research limitations and future research 
avenues. 
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CHAPTER J. Theoretical Framework 
1. Conflict in attitudes: Duality and Ambivalence as Distinct constructs 
The following sections build on the most recent views of attitudes with antagonistic 
positive and negative bases as weIl as implicit and explicit sources to explain the 
theoretical differences between ambivalence, based on discrepant attitude bases and 
duality, based on discrepant implicit and explicit attitudes. 
1.1. Recent views on an old construct 
1.1.1. The independence of positive and negative bases of evaluation 
For long, attitudes were viewed as the net difference between the positive and 
negative valences aroused by a stimulus. Eagly and Chaiken (1993)'s defmition of an 
attitude as a ''psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity 
with sorne degree of favor or disfavor' resumes this long-standing view of attitudes as a 
bipolar construct. Accordingly, attitudes were measured on unidimensional scales, 
ranging from positive to negative along a continuum. Concems on the meaning of the 
middlemost options of these scales were at the origin of a shift away from this traditional 
conceptualization of attitude, and opened the field to the conceptualization of attitudes as 
bidimensional, with independent positive and negative components. 
In investigating the problem of the "neutral" point of semantic differential scales, 
Kaplan (1972) pioneered the idea that individuals could have both positive and negative 
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evaluations of the same attitude object (see Thompson, Zanna and Griffm, 1995, for a 
review). Kaplan (1972) introduced the distinction between ambivalence (being both 
positive and negative), indifference (being neither positive nor negative) and non-attitude 
(no information on the attitude object) although these attitude positions were reflected in 
the same "neutral" response on a measurement scale. He opened the field to the 
measurement of positive and negative evaluations separately. Accordingly, Katz and Hass 
(1988) investigating the attitude toward Black people, developed two separate attitude 
scales to measure the pro-black and the anti-black substrates. The pro-black attitude 
scales contains sympathetic beliefs and feelings toward Black people as a disadvantaged 
minority group. The anti-black scale in contrast includes beHefs and related feelings about 
deviant characteristics or behaviors. They provided evidences that scores on these scales 
are largely unrelated, with sorne people scoring high on both scales (see also Hass, Katz, 
Rizzo, Bailey and Eisenstadt, 1991; Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey and Moore, 1992). Also, 
more recently, Cacioppo, Gardner, and Bemtson (1997; Cacioppo and Bemston, 1994) 
investigated the distinctiveness of these positive and negative bases of attitude and 
suggested that independent positive and negative bases underlie people's attitudes and 
might have antagonistic effects on the overall attitude (or summary evaluation) as well as 
on behavior (e.g. blood donation). These positive and negative bases seem characterized 
by distinct activation functions. The surnmary evaluation (or attitude) is either positive or 
negative when the activation of one basis is strongly dominant. When no basis strongly 
predominates, the surnmary evaluation tends to be neither positive nor negative. The 
attitude object will evoke ambivalence at high levels of both positive and negative 
activation, whereas low activation of positive and negative evaluative processes will 
reflect indifference. 
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This new line of research emphasizing the separation of positive and negative 
substrates of an attitude urges researchers to adopt an attitude framework and 
measurements allowing a more comprehensive investigation of the attitude structure and 
attitude-behavior relationship (see Cacioppo and Bemston, 1994, p. 403). It also 
highlights the source of an ambivalence conflict in the explicit evaluation of an attitude 
object, represented as the coactivation of positive and negative evaluative processes. 
Research on the ambivalence conflict will be reviewed later, but they all are based on the 
existence of these two separate bases of evaluation. 
1.1.2. The Implicit Attitude Paradigm 
Recent theorizing extends this view of attitudes as the result of conscious processing 
and makes a distinction between those evaluations generated intentionally (explicit 
attitude) and those generated without conscious awareness and control (implicit attitude). 
Attitude theorists generally conceptualize implicit attitudes as traces of past experience 
that indirectly influence responses to an attitude object "in afashion not introspectively 
known by the actor' (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995, pA). They are typically measured by 
assessing the automatic association between the attitude object and negative or positive 
valences (e.g. lAT Implicit Association Test; Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz, 1998). 
The relationship between these unconscious evaluations stored in memory (or implicit 
attitudes) and the conscious and more elaborated evaluation (or explicit attitudes) is the 
object of special scrutiny among social psychologists. One hypothesis examined is that 
implicit and explicit attitudes are in fact two facets of the same attitudinal construct. 
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"According to this view, attitudes are similar to icebergs, with explicit attitudes residing 
above the suiface of conscious control and implicit attitudes residing below it" (Karpinski 
and Hilton, 2001, p. 774). Implicit attitudes would be the attitude non-altered by social 
desirability bias. Explicit attitudes would be perverted to serve social goals. Indeed, 
whereas explicit responses are easy to alter intentionally (e.g. faking the answer), implicit 
responses are supposed to be resistant to such demands. For instance, Kim (2003) 
demonstrated that even when participants are instructed to voluntarily control their 
implicit responses, they are unable to fake them without having been taught a strategy. 
Hence, for attitude objects for which social desirability might be high (i.e. racism, sexism, 
etc.), participants may hide their negative attitude in the presence of others whereas their 
true attitude would show up in the implicit measurement. Actually, Nosek (2003) reports 
an experiment which directly addresses the role of self-presentation demands in the 
relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes. Nosek (2003) manipulated the context 
of the attitude expression from a private to a public setting, the latter involving more self-
presentation pressure. The results clearly demonstrate that explicit attitudes measured in 
private are more related to their implicit measures than those reported in a more public 
setting. Yet, if social demands might be at play in the lack of correspondence between 
explicit and implicit attitudes for socially sensitive issues, it cannot explain similar results 
for categories less subject to self-presentation bias. Nosek (2003) introduces as second 
moderator to this relationship the extent of cognitive elaboration about the attitude 
objects. He demonstrates (Study 2) that the mere fact of deep thinking on attitude objects 
or issues (e.g. such as special education vs. mainstream education) significantly improves 
the explicit-implicit correspondence. 
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Aside from this view of implicit and explicit attitudes as facts of the same 
construct, the position that implicit and explicit attitudes would be independent constructs 
starts to build considerable support among researchers (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson and Howard, 1997; Karpinski and Hilton, 2001). According 
to these researchers, implicit and explicit attitudes are the product of two information-
processing systems functioning in parallel. The explicit attitude would be the evaluation 
endorsed by the individual, controlled and consciously activated whereas the implicit 
attitude would reflect evaluations that are less subject to introspection. In particular, 
endorsement or the approval of the attitude by the holder was suggested as a potential 
source of dissociation between explicit and implicit attitudes. Hence, for Karpinski and 
Hilton (2001), implicit attitudes would reflect the associations a person has been exposed 
to in his or her environment rather than the extent to which the person currently endorses 
those evaluative associations. Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler (2000) also suggest that 
several attitudes might coexist in memory, with one attitude (the explicit) endorsed by the 
individual and one (the implicit) that might be judged inappropriate and thus consciously 
negated or unconsciously inhibited. For instance, Devine (1989) demonstrates that low-
prejudice subjects tend to inhibit automatically activated stereotype-congruent thoughts 
and replace them with thoughts reflecting equality and negations of the stereotype. This 
rejected (implicit) attitude might not always be overridden and at times might be 
expressed and influence behavior. When the person lacks motivation or capacity to 
retrieve the attitude it approves and is willing to self-report, the implicit evaluation might 
reappear and influence her behavior. Devine (1989) argues that implicitly-established 
attitudinal representations are never completely eliminated from memory, thus even low-
prejudice individuals are likely to fall into "old habits". 
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The research available comparing implicit and explicit attitudes tend to provide 
evidences for both perspectives and in fact, both views might be valid depending on the 
nature of the attitude object which is assessed. Self-presentation demands might explain, 
in part, the dissociation between implicit and explicit attitudes for socially sensitive 
issues. Cognitive elaboration could also explain this lack of correspondence, especially 
for a number of categories which require a certain level of mental processing in order to 
make an assessment. Yet, for candy bars and apples which are relatively free of social 
desirability pressures and do not require strong cognitive elaboration, Karpinski and 
Hilton (2001, Study 2) found a lack of relation between explicit and implicit measures of 
attitude i.e. non-significant correlations between the lAT and their two direct measures of 
explicit attitude with r ranging from -.10 to .16. Karpinski and Hilton (2001) interpret 
this lack of correspondence with what Wilson et al. calI "dual attitudes" or the existence 
of an implicit-explicit discrepancy in a number of participants, with one attitude that tends 
to be more positive toward candy bars (based on its sensorial qualities) and another one 
that tends to be more negative (based on health-related consequences). Indeed, in the 
context of food, and especially in the context of restrained eating, the existence of two 
discrepant attitudes toward high-fat products is conceivable, one negative (explicit) and 
related to current dieting status and another that is positive (implicit) and overridden. 
Roefs and Jansen (2002) study on implicit and explicit attitude toward high fat food did 
not find such a discrepancy. In their study, both obese and normal weight participants 
displayed a negative implicit and explicit attitude toward high-fat food. Yet, Roefs and 
Jansen (2002) did not test specific high-fat products (e.g. chocolate) but rather the 
abstract category high-fat vs. low fat. It is likely that participants had a negative implicit 
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attitude toward the category high-fat but a positive attitude toward exemplars of the 
category, especially those with most cravings such as chocolaté. 
In summary, the implicit attitude paradigm set the stage for the existence of an 
additional attitude conflict as ide from ambivalence, which will be called hereafter dual 
conflict or duality, stemming in the opposition of two attitudes, one implicit and 
overridden and another explicit and endorsed (Wilson et al. 2000). 
1.2. Two types of attitudinal conflict: ambivalence and duality 
Duality (Wilson et al. 2000) or implicit-explicit inconsistency can easily be related 
to ambivalence, as in both cases, people hold conflicting evaluations of an attitudinal 
object. Yet, empirical work by Wilson and Lindsey (1998 unpublished; cited in Wilson et 
al. 2000) tend to support the distinctiveness of both constructs. Individuals with dual 
attitudes were not any more ambivalent than those with non-dual attitudes. In line with 
Wilson and colleagues, it is proposed that duality and ambivalence are two distinct 
constructs that must be investigated concomitantly in order to gain a comprehensive 
picture of the attitude structure and attitude-behavior links. CUITent theoretical 
perspectives on both ambivalence and duality conflict are examined in the next two 
sections. 
1.2.1. Ambivalent attitudes: Discrepancies between explicit evaluations 
Over the last decade, social psychologists expanded the theoretical base of 
ambivalence and intended to clarify its defInition (Maio, Esses and Bell, 2000; Thompson 
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et al. 1995). For instance, Thompson et al. (1995) argue that inconsistency is a necessary 
condition to experience ambivalence, but it is not sufficient. First, the inconsistent bases 
must be similar in magnitude. As the difference in magnitude increases, the attitude 
becomes polarized in the direction of the stronger basis. That is, the ambivalence conflict 
will be greater the more nearly equal are one's negative and positive bases of evaluation 
(e.g. being highly positive and at the same time mildly negative toward going on a diet 
produces no conflict). Second, ambivalence involves inconsistent evaluative bases of at 
least moderate intensity (e.g. attitudes both highly positive and highly negative toward 
going on a diet would produce more ambivalence than attitudes both mildly positive and 
negative). Maio et al. (2000) build on this model (referred to as the Similarity Intensity 
Model) to draw a c1ear distinction between ambivalence and inconsistency. According to 
their view, "ambivalence is the amount of conflict or non-conflict within an attitude 
whereas inconsistency is simply a function of the magnitude of the difference between 
evaluations" (p. 62). Maio and his collaborators point to the idea that ambivalence might 
be experienced with a threshold level of tension in the attitude, which Priester and Petty 
(1996; 2(01) defme as subjective ambivalence in their GraduaI Threshold Model of 
ambivalence. 
Specifically, Priester and Petty (1996; 2001) studied the relationship between 
objective and subjective measures of ambivalence. They demonstrate that subjective 
ambivalence is mainly driven by the amount of conflicting reactions (i.e. negative 
reactions associated with an attitude object evaluated more positively; positive reactions 
associated with an attitude object evaluated more negatively). Dominant reactions (i.e. 
positive reactions associated with an attitude object evaluated more positively; negative 
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reactions associated with an attitude object evaluated more negatively) matter only when 
conflieting reactions are below a threshold level, and even then, they are weighted less 
than conflicting reactions. 
1.2.2. Dual attitudes: Discrepancies between implicit and explicit evaluations 
If ambivalence involves discrepancies between evaluations at the explicit and 
conscious level, it has also been suggested that inconsistencies might occur between 
implicit and explicit evaluations (i.e. dual attitudes, Wilson et al. 2000). For instance, 
literature on prejudice suggests that people might have implicit and explicit evaluations of 
different valences toward the same group, and although endorsing consciously egalitarian 
values they might have negative feelings below awareness (Dovidio et al. 1997; Dovidio, 
Kawakami and Gaertner, 2002). Recently, Madon, Smith and Guyll (2005) also reported 
dual attitudes toward stigmatized individuals. 
An interesting study by de Jong, van den Hout, Rietbroek and Huijding (2003) 
found such dual attitudes toward spiders in non-phobie people. Although both phobie and 
non-phobie participants were equally displaying a negative implicit attitude toward 
spiders, non-phobie nonetheless had a neutral explicit evaluation. Jong et al. (2003) 
explain these findings by the development of negative implicit attitudes toward spiders 
early in childhood. Later acquired beliefs that spiders are harmless might alter the explicit 
attitude but a change in the implicit attitude might require more extensive direct 
experience with spiders. 
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Wilson et al. (2000) c1assify dual attitudes into four groups depending on the level 
of awareness of the implicit attitude and the capacity and motivation required to override 
it. Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to test these four sources of duality, 
they are interesting in the comprehension of the processes that might be involved in the 
context of food. The frrst type of dual attitudes results from repression. In this case, an 
attitude might be a source of strong psychological tension and is replaced by an opposite 
attitude as a defense mechanism. In this type of duality, individuals are not aware of their 
implicit attitude, unless they remove their motive to repress it. The example given by 
Wilson et al. (2000) of individuals attracted to people of the same sex who block access 
to their impulses and develop homophobia is representative of repression. The second 
type of dual attitudes that has been proposed is dissociation, which is based on the 
existence oftwo independent systems of evaluation (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995), one 
influencing unconscious responses and the other conscious responses. Implicit and 
explicit attitudes are fully dissociated and people are not aware of their implicit attitudes, 
which might have developed through past experiences with the attitude object. For 
instance, an individual raised in a racist family might change her attitude when in contact 
with Black people, yet the traces of past experiences might remain at the unconscious 
level. The third type of dual attitudes is automatic overriding by which when people have 
the capacity and motivation to retrieve their explicit attitude, it automatically "short-
circuits" (in Wilson et al. terms) the implicit one and prevent people to experience it 
consciously. If people lack the capacity or motivation to retrieve their explicit attitude, the 
implicit attitude might reach awareness and determine both explicit and implicit 
responses. Wilson et al. (2000) label their last type of dual attitudes motivated 
overriding. In contrast to repression and dissociation, individuals are fully aware of both 
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their implicit and explicit evaluations, yet the implicit attitude is unwanted or viewed as 
illegitimate, which leads people to override it. This type of dual attitudes is the one which 
is most subject to be interpreted as ambivalence. Indeed, in this case like for ambivalent 
attitudes, people are aware that they have conflicting evaluations of an attitude object. A 
major difference lies in the endorsement of the positive and negative evaluations. 
Interestingly however, virtually none of the definitions of ambivalence integrates 
endorsement of the positive and negative evaluations as part of the defmition (Bell and 
Esses, 1997). If people view both positive and negative beHefs as relevant and legitimate, 
they will experience ambivalence and vacillate from a positive evaluation to a negative 
one. Yet, if people do not endorse one evaluation, it will be overridden. Nonetheless, it 
will not be completely eliminated and will remain at the unconscious level as an implicit 
attitude toward the object. For instance, restrained eaters might have at the same times a 
strong positive attitude toward chocolate justifying their temptations and a strong 
negative attitude linked to the negative consequences for their diet. Their attitude might 
be categorized as ambivalent along the CUITent definition of ambivalence. Yet, taking into 
account their dedication to their diet, they might find that their positive evaluation is 
illegitimate and override it. Altematively, these restrained eaters might have trained 
themselves to avoid chocolate and repress their natural inclination. 
This research tests the distinctiveness of both ambivalence and duality constructs 
through providing evidence that dual attitudes are not any more or less ambivalent than 
non-dual. It is proposed also that ambivalence stems from equivalent endorsement (i.e. 
importance and relevance as proxy) of both positive and negative bases of evaluation 
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whereas dual attitudes involve one basis of evaluation which is more important and 
relevant than the other. 
Hypothesis 1: Duality and. ambivalence are two distinct conceptualizations of 
attitude conflict 
Hypothesis 2: 
H2.I. For ambivalent attitudes, there is equivalent endorsement of both positive and 
negative bases of evaluation. 
H2.2. For dual attitudes, one basis of evaluation is more important and relevant than 
the other. 
2. Influence of attitudinal conflicts on attitude strength and behavior 
The following sections expose the consequences of holding ambivalent and dual 
attitudes on the subjective experience of conflict. In addition, a number of predictions are 
presented on explicit attitude strength and attitude-behavior relations based on CUITent 
knowledge on ambivalence and implicit processes. 
2.1. Subjective experience of conflict 
An additional aspect inherent to the definition of ambivalence is the related subjective 
experience of tension, expressed as a conscious experience of internaI conflict, resulting 
from mixed beliefs or feelings (i.e. measured as subjective ambivalence or felt 
ambivalence). For instance, Hass et al. (1992) demonstrated that activating racial 
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ambivalence induces psychological discomfort and negative mood changes. Newby-
Clark, McGregor and Zanna (2002) also advocate that inconsistency-related discomfort is 
likely to occur when individuals are aware of their contradictions. 
Being aware of the evaluative inconsistencies seems necessary to experience 
negative affect. Yet, Devine, Monteith, and colleagues (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink and 
Elliot, 1991; Monteith, Devine, and Zuwerink, 1993; Monteith and Voils, 1998; 
Zuwerink, Monteith, Devine and Cook, 1996) repeatedly found that many low-prejudice 
people sometimes violate their non-prejudice commitments and when they realize they 
do, they feel compunction or guilt. In addition, Plant and Devine (1998) argue that this 
negative affect is a form of "self-irnposed punishment". People holding dual attitudes do 
not anticipate that they could have diverging reactions and when they react in a fashion 
opposed to their explicit goals or mIes, they experience negative feelings. Hence, 
negative affect (e.g. guilt, shame) and discomfort is likely to be experienced when the 
behavior is performed, due to diverging spontaneous and controlled reactions. For 
instance, Dovidio et al. (1997) found that the implicit negative racial attitude was the best 
predictor of negative arousal, expressed as differences in rates of blinking and 
percentages of visual contact with a black compared to a white interviewer. Hence, the 
subjective experience of conflict is more likely to manifest itself when a behavior is 
initiated, when the drive of the implicit pre-disposition opposes a more rational response. 
This tension would be more similar to the psychological discomfort one experiences 
when acting contrary to one's attitude (i.e. similar to cognitive dissonance, Festinger, 
1957). Hetherington and Macdiarmid (1993) report such a negative affect in dieters 
following the consumption of chocolate whereas non dieters retained their positive mood. 
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Thus, it is proposed that ambivalence and duality both entail an experience of 
conflict, but of a different nature. Whereas ambivalence leads to a conscious experience 
of conflict (i.e. related to inconsistent evaluations and measured as subjective 
ambivalence), duality entails a conflict and a discornfort which is more likely to be 
experienced in reaction to one' s own behavior. For instance, restrained eaters report being 
guilty and ashamed after having broken their diet through overeating or simply eating a 
forbidden food. Hence, holding dual attitudes should not be experienced as subjective 
ambivalence. 
Hypothesis 3: 
ID.I. Ambivalent attitudes are associated with an experience of subjective 
ambivalence (i.e. expressed tension identified by individuals as resulting from 
conflicting evaluations). 
ID.2. Dual attitudes also lead to an experience of conflict, but are less likely 
expressed as subjective ambivalence. 
2.2. Strength of the summary evaluation 
The moderating effect of ambivalence has been extensively studied on three 
dimensions of attitude strength (accessibility, stability and certainty). In addition, these 
measures were suggested as major dimensions of attitude strength in numerous researches 
(e.g. Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent and Carnot, 1993 for a review). In the 
following section, the moderating effect of ambivalence on these three dimensions of 
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attitude strength as weIl as the differential effects predicted when holding or not dual 
attitudes are reviewed. 
2.2.1. Attitude accessibility 
Accessibility refers to the object -evaluation link and ease of retrieval from memory 
(Krosnick et al., 1993). Increased attitude ambivalence has been generally associated with 
decreased overall attitude accessibility (Bargh et al., 1992; Bassili, 1996; Lavine et al., 
1998). Thompson et al. (1995) suggest that this negative relation between ambivalence 
and attitude accessibility might be due to two highly accessible bases. Based on this line 
of reasoning, Bargh et al. (1992) provide evidence that the higher latency of response for 
ambivalent individuals is due to a response competition between the positive and negative 
bases of their evaluation. Newby-Clark et al. (2002) also found the strongest relation 
between potential ambivalence and felt ambivalence (or subjective feeling of tension) 
when simultaneous accessibility of the conflicting bases is highest. 
Dual attitudes also involve a response competition between the implicit and explicit 
attitudes. Implicit attitudes are assumed to be activated automatically when encountering 
the attitude object, without mediation of cognitive processes. In contrast, explicit attitudes 
are supposed to be less automatic and requiring capacity and motivation to retrieve 
(Wilson et al., 2000). Nonetheless, Devine (1989) suggests that explicit attitudes must be 
well-established, elaborated and accessible enough in order to repress or override the 
automatically activated attitude and maintain the explicit position. Consistent with this 
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reasoning, Petty and Jarvis (1998) found that people with dual attitudes did not differ 
from those with non-dual attitudes on measures of accessibility. 
Hypothesis 4: 
H4.1. Ambivalence is a moderator of accessibility. Attitudes will be less accessible at 
higher levels of ambivalence, due to equally high accessibility of both positive and 
negative bases of evaluation. 
H4.2. Duality is a moderator of accessibility only at high level of ambivalence. At high 
level of ambivalence, the explicit attitude will be less accessible for dual than for non 
dual participants due to an increased demand in motivation and cognitive capacity 
in order to retrieve the attitude. At lower levels of ambivalence, the existence of one 
dominant basis of evaluation for both dual and non dual should result in equal 
accessibility. 
2.2.2. Attitude stability 
Ambivalent attitudes were also found to be more likely to vary as a result of 
temporary shifts in the salience of their bases (Lavine et al., 1998; Bargh et al, 1992; 
Bassili, 1996), which creates instability, with overall evaluations either positive or 
negative, depending on contextual factors. Literature on prejudice provides ample 
evidence that depending on what aspects of the ambivalent attitude is made salient, 
different attitudinal positions and behaviors emerge (Hass et al. 1992; Katz and Hass, 
1988). For instance, studies have found that people ambivalent toward a group respond 
more favorably when their positive feelings are primed than when their negative feelings 
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are primed (and conversely) whereas the attitude of non ambivalent subjects is more 
stable (Bell and Esses, 1997; MacDonald and Zanna, 1998; Glick, Diebold, Bailey-
Werner, and Zhu, 1997). Jonas, Broemer and Diehl (2000) studied a variety of attitudes 
and behaviors and theirresults show a weak but reliable moderating effect of 
ambivalence on attitude stability. Thus, higher levels of ambivalence toward food should 
be related to higher instability of the summary evaluation. 
In contrast, in the context of dual attitudes, explicit attitudes should be instrumental to 
people's internal goals (e.g. help restrained eaters not falling into temptation). Hence, 
these attitudes should be strong and particularly stable evaluations, strongly endorsed, in 
order to override the implicit attitude when activated. 
Hypothesis 5: 
H5.1. Ambivalence has a moderating effect on stability. Attitudes will be less stable 
and should shüt more easily at higher levels of ambivalence, due to equallegitimacy 
of both positive and negative bases of evaluations. 
HS.2. Duality should not be a moderator of attitude stability, as the existence of one 
dominant and more legitimate basis of evaluation should make the evaluation less 
Iikely to vary. 
2.3.3 Attitude certainty 
Attitude certainty refers to the degree to which people are confident that their attitude 
toward an object or an issue is correct (Krosnick et al., 1993). Ambivalence has been 
associated with a decreased level of confidence in one's evaluation (Jonas, Diehl and 
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Broemer, 1997; see also Bassili, 1996). For instance, in one of the few research studies in 
which ambivalence was manipulated in an experimental paradigm, Jonas et al. (1997) 
demonstrated that increased ambivalence is related to decreased confidence in 
individuals' attitudes toward buying a shampoo. 
In parallel, the existence of a conflicting evaluation, either repressed or 
overridden, is likely to undermine the confidence of individuals holding a dual attitude. 
Tormala, Brüiol and Petty (2003) fmdings suggest that if a persuasive communication is 
successful in changing implicit attitudes and reducing implicit-explicit dissociations, it 
also has an impact on the explicit level on the confidence with which the attitude is held. 
Hence for this dimension of attitude strength, it is proposed that dual attitudes might be 
held with less confidence due to the existence of two discrepant evaluations. 
Hypothesis 6: 
H6.1. Ambivalence is a moderator of certainty. Attitudes will be held with less 
certainty at higher levels of ambivalence. 
H6.2. Duality is a moderator of certainty. Attitudes will be held with less certainty in 
dual compared to non dual individuals. 
2.3. Attitude-behavior relationship 
Most researchers agree that ambivalent attitudes should be poor predictors of 
behavior. Ambivalent attitudes, based on discrepant information, were shown to lead to 
lower attitude-intention consistency (Armitage and Conner, 2000; Povey, Wellens and 
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Conner, 2001; Sparks et aL, 1992) and lower attitude-behavior consistency (Armitage and 
Conner, 2000; Conner et al. 2002). For instance, in a study comparing attitudes and 
intentions toward meat, vegetarian and vegan diets, Povey et al. (2001) found attitudes to 
be better predictors of following each diet at lower levels of ambivalence. Also, Armitage 
and Conner (2000) found that the less ambivalent attitudes toward low-fat diets predicted 
behavior directly whereas weaker attitudes exerted an indirect influence on behavior via 
intentions (see also Conner et al. 2002). The rational for low attitude-behavior 
consistency when holding ambivalent attitudes are twofold: First, because summary 
evaluations based on ambivalence are less accessible (Bargh et al. 1992; Bassili 1996; 
Lavine et al. 1998), they should be less likely to bias perceptions of the attitude object in 
behavioral situations. Second, behavior is controlled by the attitude at the moment the 
behavior is initiated. Yet, attitudes based on ambivalence are unstable (Bargh et al 1992; 
Bassili 1996) and they should be weakly linked to the subsequent behavior (Lavine et al., 
1998). For instance, researchers showed that ambivalence might create extreme reactions 
and behaviors toward members of stigmatized groups either in a favorable or unfavorable 
direction dependent on contextual factors, in an effort to negate the positive or negative 
aspects of the evaluation (Hass et al. 1992; Katz and Hass, 1988). Also, Jonas, Broemer 
and Diehl (2000) precisely found such a relationship between ambivalence, temporal 
stability and behavior. 
In contrast, when dual attitudes exist, the explicit attitude must be weIl established to 
serve as competitive responses to the automatically activated attitude (Devine, 1989). The 
explicit attitude must be elaborated and accessible enough such as to bias or negate the 
implicit information in such a way as to maintain the explicit position. Studies on 
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prejudices provide evidence that the explicit evaluation of non-prejudiced people is 
strongly related to their behavioral intention, as well as their overt and controlled 
behavior (Dovidio et al. 1997; Fazio et al. 1995). 
Yet, implicit attitudes were found to be better predictors of spontaneous responses that 
lie outside of conscious awareness and control (e.g. non verbal behaviors such as blinking 
and visual contact, Dovidio et al., 1997; frequency ofhanding a pen to an African 
American vs. placing it on the table, Wilson et al., 2(00). Similarly, Fazio and 
collaborators (1995) demonstrated that an implicit measure of prejudice predicts how 
smoothly white subjects will interact with black partners. Amodio, Harmon-Jones and 
Devine (2003) also demonstrate that controlled processes are more involved in 
determining deliberative responses (Le. self-report) whereas implicit affective race biases 
are more exhibited in eyeblink responses. In the same vein, Dovidio, Kawakami and 
Gaertner (2002) found that whites' explicit attitudes toward blacks were better reflected 
in their verbal behaviors whereas their implicit attitudes predicted their non-verbal 
friendliness. Such antagonistic effects of the implicit and explicit attitudes are particularly 
apparent in the case of temptations, where impulses resulting from an activation of the 
implicit attitude facilitate behaviors incompatible with deliberate evaluations (Karpinski 
and Hilton, 2(00). Recently, Perugini (2005) tested this "double dissociation pattern" (p. 
39) in an experiment offerlng participants the choice between a snack and a fruit and 
using the recollection of their past behavior as proxy for controlled choice. His 
conclusions are strongly in favor of implicit preferences influencing spontaneous choice 
with no significant influence of explicit preference whereas explicit preferences clearly 
show the opposite pattern, with strong influences on deliberative behavior and no 
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influence on spontaneous choice (study 1). Nonetheless, Perugini (2005) also found that 
the prediction of being a smoker or not (Study 1) is more effective when having both the 
implicit and explicit attitude entered as predictors, especially when explicit and implicit 
attitudes are congruent (i.e. non dual). Perugini proposes that spontaneous behaviors 
involve a mix of both automatic and controlled components, with the controlled 
components more likely to act as an overriding mechanism. His results also suggest that 
when attitudes are not congruent, the influence of the implicit might be magnified. 
Unfortunately, Perugini was not able to fully test his hypothesis in the context of his 
research (see p. 39 Study 2), mainly because of a small sample size. 
Hypothesis 7: Spontaneous (immediate) choice 
H7.1. Spontaneous choice will be intluenced by both the implicit and explicit 
attitude. 
H7.2. Ambivalence is not a moderator of spontaneous choice. 
H7.3. Duality is a moderator of spontaneous choice. The influence of the implicit 
attitude on spontaneous choice will be stronger when holding dual attitudes. 
Hypothesis 8: Controlled (intentional) choice 
H8.1. Controlled choice will be intluenced by the explicit attitude. 
H8.2. Ambivalence will be a moderator of the attitude-controlled choice relation. 
Attitude will be more predictive of behavior at lower levels of ambivalence. 
H8.3. Duality will have no intluence on the attitude-controlled choice relation. 
Figure 1 illustrates this view that the explicit attitude - through the devotion of more 
cognitive capacity and motivation - will influence primarily controlled and deliberate 
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behaviors (i.e. behavioral intention as proxy for overt and deliberate behavior) whereas 
the implicit attitude influences responses that are more spontaneous and uncontrollable 
(i.e. spontaneous responses will be elicited as proxy by a real choice between two 
alternatives, one eliciting more immediate and intense affect and one eliciting more 
positive cognitions). Shiv and Fedhorikin (1999; 2002) give credit to this view through 
demonstrating that when decisions are made quickly and under impairment of processing 
resources, choices are driven by automatic affective processes, otherwise choices are 
influenced by the higher-order (more controlled) processes. 
Figure 1: The intemlay between implicit and explicit attitude in driving controlled and 
spontaneous behavior 
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CHAPTER II: Empirical Findings 
The hypotheses presented in chapter 1 were tested in a laboratory session with a sample of 
199 participants. In order to detennine the focal attitude object as well as the contrast 
category and alternative choice to be introduced in this frrst study, a pilot study was 
conducted on a smaller sample (N = 40). First, results of this pilot study are reviewed, 
followed by method and results for study 1. 
1. Pilot Study 
The pilot study inc1uded an assessment of the preference (implicit via the lAT and 
explicit) between frrst, a soda and a water brand and second, chocolate and yoghurt. The 
water and yoghurt were a-priori chosen as contrasting categories for their neutral 
properties. A positive implicit attitude toward both chocolate and soda was expected in 
addition to high levels of ambivalence toward both products. 
1.1 Method 
Participants. 40 participants were recruited on McGill campus. 60% were female. 67.5% 
were aged 18-24 and 27.5% were between 25-34 years old. 70% were undergraduate 
students and 20% graduate students. 50% had English as first language and 22.5% 
French. 22.5% had spent less than three years in Canada. Participants received a $10 
compensation for their participation in the study. 
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Overview. The cover story for the experiment was the assessment of word categorization 
as an automatic skill. After filling out an informed consent form and a one-page 
demographic questionnaire, participants were assigned to one of two desktop computers 
running Inquisit software. Subjects were seated at about 65 cm from the computer 
display. The experimenter showed the participants the keys on the keyboard that would be 
used during the experiment. Participants were required to practice several times the use of 
the appropriate keys. During the lA Ts phase, participants had to press the "E" key with 
their left index fmger and the "1" key with their right index fmger. During the explicit 
phase, participants had to use the numeric keypad with their right index fmger. No other 
keys were active during the test. At the end of the computer session, participants moved 
to another room where the experimenter was giving them the $10 contribution. The entire 
experiment took no longer than 30 minutes. 
IATmeasures. Each subject completed two IATs in counterbalanced order. The IATs 
were using as target-concept discrimination soda vs. bottled water and chocolate bars vs. 
yoghurts. 
Materials. The chocolate and soda lA Ts used the same sets of adjectives (five 
pleasant and five unpleasant) selected from Ottaway, Hayden and Oakes (2001). 10 target 
brands were used for each lAT (five per category). Each set of five brands was selected in 
two pre-tests. In the fIfst pre-test (n=38), participants had to rate a set of brands on 
familiarity (How familiar are you with the following brands? Very unfamiliar = -3; very 
familiar = 3) and association with the product categories (How much would you associate 
the following brands with chocolate bars / yoghurts / sodas / water? Not at aIl = 0; Very 
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much == 6). In the second pre-test (n==20), participants had to rate the set of brands 
simultaneously on association with the target category and dissociation from the 
contrasting category (e.g. How much wou Id you associate the foHowing brands with 
either the category yoghurts or the category chocolate bars? Strongly associated with 
yoghurts == -3; neither associated with yoghurts nor with chocolate bars = 0; strongly 
associated with chocolate bars == 3). The sets of brands selected for the contrasting 
categories (e.g. soda vs. bottled water) were perfectly matched on word length, 
familiarity, and association with the target category (e.g. soda) and dissociation with the 
contrasting category (e.g. water) (see Appendix 3 and 4). 
Procedure. The frrst lAT used a complete sequence of seven blocks (similar to 
that presented in Appendix 7): (a) evaluative attribute discrimination (b) initial target 
discrimination (c) practice initial combined task (d) test initial combined task (e) reversed 
target discrimination (f) practice reversed combined task (g) test reversed combined task. 
The following lA Ts did not include practice on the evaluative attribute discrimination 
(see Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz, 1998). The order of the initial and reversed 
combinations was counterbalanced for aH lA Ts. The evaluative attribute block included 
aH pleasant and unpleasant words. Each target discrimination block included aH 10 target 
words. Each practice combined block included 20 trials including 10 evaluative attributes 
and the 10 target words. Each test combined block included 40 trials including twice each 
target word and twice each evaluative attribute. Each target word was repeated 8 times in 
each lAT. AH participants responded to pleasant words with the left key and unpleasant 
words with the right key, as key assignment does not affect IATs results (see Greenwald 
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et al., 1998). When participants made an error, a black X was appearing under the word 
until the answer was corrected. 
Explicit measures. Mter the sequences of lA Ts, participants read on the screen that the 
next questions wou Id assess variables that could have an impact on the speed with which 
they categorized the words. Explicit measures were administered in four blocks and 
questions within blocks were randomized. The fIfst block was assessing the attitude 
toward each category and the fourth block the past behavior. The second and third blocks 
included questions on ambivalence with positive and negative evaluations presented in a 
counterbalanced order. Attitude was measured on a seven-point scale "how favorable is 
your attitude toward" anchored by very unfavorable-very favorable. Next, following 
Kaplan (1972), ambivalence was measured on unidimensional4 points scales. For the 
positive evaluation, participants were asked to consider only the positive aspects of the 
product and ignore the negative aspects. Afterwards, they indicated how favorable the 
attitude toward the products are on a scale anchored by not at aIl favorable-very 
favorable. In turn, for the negative evaluation, they were asked to consider only the 
negative aspects, and indicated how unfavorable was their attitude, on a scale anchored 
by not at aIl unfavorable-very favorable. FinaIly, past behavior was assessed with a seven 
point scale on how frequently did you use (drink, eat etc.) this product in the past week 
anchored by never-very frequently. 
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1.2. Results 
Implicit attitude measure. The analysis proceeds according to Greenwald. Nosek and 
Banaji (2003) improved scoring algorithm which uses individual participants sn to 
provide the scale unit. This algorithm presents strong advantages over the conventional 
1998 one (Greenwald et al.. 1998). for instance resistance to contamination due to slower 
speed responding. But in particular. taking into account the characteristics of this study 
which involves multiple lA Ts. the improved algorithm provides measures that are more 
resistant to prior experience with the lAT. Aiso. the required sample size for power of .80 
to reject Ho is reduced from 63 to 39 participants (see Greenwald et al.. 2003). 
Following Greenwald et al. (2003).latencies lower than 300ms were recoded to 
300ms and latencies higher than 3000ms were recoded to 3000ms. A log-transfonnation 
was computed on the latencies in order to improve stability of variance. The average error 
rate was below 8% in aIl lA Ts. 
Soda lAT effect. Table 1 displays the average latencies (Av.Lat.) and the mean differences 
between the initial condition and the reversed condition (c and d and f and g steps) in log-
transformed values (ConvLog.) and in milliseconds (ConvMs). d is the difference 
between block means divided by the standard deviation of latencies in the blocks. By 
convention. 0.2 is considered a small lAT effect. 0.5 a medium effect and 0.8 a large 
effect (Greenwald et al.. 1998). 
As one can notice. the lAT effect for the soda lAT (d = 0.022) is not significantly 
different from O. This result shows that there is no implicit preference at the aggregate 
level between water and soda. 
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Chocolate lAT effect. The lAT effect (d = 0.212) for chocolate is low but 
significantly different from Ü. This effect indicates more positive attitudes toward 
chocolate bars than yoghurts. 
Table 1 : Implicit attitude measures 
Av. Lat. ConvLog ConvMs d 
Soda_water 999ms 0.0225 13.25 0.022 
Yoghurt choco 1030ms 0.0897 78.019 0.212 
The bar chart in figure 2 presents the average response latency in milliseconds when 
chocolate bars and soda where associated on the same key as good words and when they 
were associated on the same key as bad words. Participants found easier to associate 
chocolate bars with good words (as indicated by the slower response latency) than to 
associate chocolate bars with bad words, indicating a positive implicit attitude toward 
chocolate bars. For soda, the difference is not significant. 
Figure 2: response latencies {in millisecondsl for the two IATs 
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Explicit attitude measure. 
Soda vs. Water. There is a significant difference in the mean explicit attitude 
between water and soda showing a "preference" for water (mean = 4.60, S.D. 1.582 vs. 
mean = 3.70, S.D. 1.620, t(39)=2.504, p=O.017). A difference score between attitude 
toward water and attitude toward soda was also computed (Greenwald et al., 2003; 
Karpinski and Hilton, 2001). Through this score, 55% indicated a preference for water, 
30% a preference for soda and 15% equal preference for the two drinks. 
Chocolate vs. Yoghurts. There is no difference in means between explicit attitude 
toward chocolate bars and yoghurts (mean = 5.00, S.D. 1.468 vs. mean= 4.77, S.D. 1.593, 
t(39)=Ü.640, p=Ü.526). The difference score indicated that 47.5% of participants preferred 
yoghurts, 40% preferred chocolate and 12.5% had equal explicit preference for the two 
snacks. 
Relationship between implicit and explicit attitude 
The correlations between the lA Ts and the explicit attitude measures are low and 
non significant (p >0.10), both for the drinks (r= 0.024) and for the snacks (r=O.197), 
indicating that explicit and implicit measures are weakly related, and giving credit to an 
implicit -explicit dissociation toward these products. 
Ambivalence measures 
Estimates of positive and negative evaluations were combined into a numerical 
index using Griffin Similarity-Intensity formula (P + N)12 - IP - NI (Thompson, Zanna 
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and Griffm, 1995). This fonnula constantly proved highest validity over alternative 
measures (see Riketta, 2000, Breckler, 1994). 
The mean ambivalence index for soda (mean = 1.275, S.D. 0.784) is significantly 
higher than that for water (mean = 0.300, S.D. 0.853, t(39)= 5.420, p=O.OOO). The mean 
ambivalence index for chocolate (mean= 1.237, S.D. 0.974) is also significantly higher 
than that for yoghurt (mean= 0.312, S.D. 0.867, t(39)=4.725, p=O.OOO). The ambivalence 
level for chocolate bars is equal to that for soda (t(39)=O.205, p=O.839). In summary, both 
soda and chocolate raise high levels of ambivalence. 
1.3. Summary 
As predicted, there is a significant lAT effect for the chocolate-yoghurt option. In 
addition, it appears that more participants would prefer at the explicit level the yoghurt, 
which gives credit for the existence of an implicit-explicit dissociation (i.e. dual attitudes) 
toward chocolate. Yet, there is no implicit preference between the soda and the water 
option. Contrary to intuitive thinking, it is likely that both water and soda yield to a 
positive implicit attitude of same intensity. Last, both soda and chocolate raise high 
levels of ambivalence. 
In line with these findings, study 1 will focus on chocolate. It is expected that this 
food item would yield a positive implicit attitude, and might create conflicted attitudes 
(i.e. both dual and ambivalent) in certain populations. Accordingly, Hetherington and 
Macdiarmid (1993) report that chocolate is the food item that is most likely to produce 
conflict and ambivalence and trigger loss of control. Especially, they report that dieters 
"experience the greatest conflict between the desire for chocolate and feelings of 
reproach or regret following consumption of chocolate" (p. 243). 
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2. Study 1: Influence of attitude conflicts on attitude and behavior 
2.1 Method study 1 
2.1.1 Sample 
201 participants were recruited through an announcement in local English-
speaking newspapers in Montreal, Canada. Proficiency in English was a requirement in 
order to be able to take the implicit attitude tasks which are based on English words 
categorization. The sample was highly fluent in English, with a mean of 6.55 out of 7 
(S.D. 0.92). A minimum of one year of residency was also required, in order to be 
familiar with the chocolate bars and yoghurt brands. Accordingly, two participants were 
exc1uded from the analyses due to less than a year of residency in Canada (mean 
residency = 20.32 years, S.D. 13.86). The sample was evenly distributed on gender, with 
53.7% female participants. The average age was 28.2 y.o. (S.D. 9.75). AlI participants 
had a normal vision (or corrected to normal) except for two participants who reported 
themselves as color blind and will be exc1uded of several analyses involving color 
discrimination (e.g. EAST). Participants received a $25 compensation for their 
participation in the study. 
2.1.2. Procedure 
The cover story for the experiment was the assessment of word categorization as 
an automatic skill (same cover story as in the pilot study). After filling out an informed 
consent form and a demographic/screening questionnaire, participants were seated in 
front of a desktop computer running the Inquisit software. 
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The participants undertook fIfst the implicit tasks and afterwards the explicit task, 
as it was demonstrated that implicit tasks have no effect on the following explicit ones 
whereas eliciting explicit first might have an impact (Karpinski and Hilton, 2001). Four 
implicit tasks (lAT, GNAT, EAST, Evaluative Priming, see Appendixl for details) were 
inc1uded, for two reasons: fIfst, each of these measures has a different interest in terms of 
the assessment of an implicit preference relative to a contrasting category (lAT), or an 
implicit attitude without requiring a contrasting category (GNAT, EAST). Second, the 
reliability of the implicit measures has frequently been debated in the literature (see 
Cunningham, Preacher and Banaji, 2001). For several tests, the reliability is unknown 
(EAST, evaluative priming) or is very low according to the handful studies in which it 
was tested (e.g. GNAT split-half reliability 0.20, Nosek and Banaji, 2001). 
Before undertaking each test, the experimenter showed the specific keys to be 
used and the participants were requested to practice the use of these keys. At the end of 
the computer session, participants moved to another room where the experimenter gave 
them the cash contribution plus a choice of products. They also had to fill out a post-
choice paper and pencil questionnaire. The entire experiment took between 50 and 60 
minutes to complete. 
Demographies and sereening questionnaire. Participants started by filling out a 
questionnaire inc1uding demographic questions as well as specific questions on their 
health, inc1uding their vision (normal or corrected to normal; ability to discriminate 
colors) and specific food disorders (diabetes; specific diets; food allergies). They also 
reported their height and weight (BMI), their level of hunger and thirst, and their mood 
before starting the experiment. 
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lmplicit measures. 
One out of four subjects had a different sequence for indirect measures in ordinal 
positions (see Appendix 5). The experiment's four indirecttasks used the same set of 
stimulus words (see Appendix 6). Ten adjectives - five pleasant and five unpleasant -
were selected from Ottaway, Hayden and Oakes (2001) and the pleasant and unpleasant 
sets were matched on word length (average length 8.6 for pleasant words, 8.8 for 
unpleasant words). The ten target brands were the same as those used for the pilot study. 
Each target brand is repeated 8 times in the lAT, 6 times in each color in the EAST and 9 
times as signal in the GNAT (6 times as noise). In the evaluative priming test, only the 
two most familiar urnbrella brand names for each category were inc1uded as primes (e.g. 
Hershey and Cadbury vs. Yoplait and Danone). 
lAT. The procedure is the same as implemented in the pilot study. The fIfst lAT 
used a complete sequence of seven blocks (similar to that presented in Appendix 7): (a) 
evaluative attribute discrimination (b) initial target discrimination (c) practice initial 
combined task (d) test initial combined task (e) reversed target discrimination (f) practice 
reversed combined task (g) test reversed combined task. The evaluative attribute block 
included aIl pleasant and unpleasant words. Each target discrimination block inc1uded aIl 
target words. Each practice combined block (blocks c and f) inc1uded 20 trials inc1uding 
10 evaluative attributes and the 10 target words. Each test combined block (blocks d and 
g) included 40 trials including twice each target word and twice each evaluative attribute. 
AII participants responded to pleasant words with the left key and unpleasant words with 
the right key, as key assignment does not affect IATs results (see Greenwald et al., 1998). 
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When participants made an error, a black X appeared under the word until the answer was 
corrected. 
EAST. In the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (De Houwer, 2003), participants see 
white words that need to be c1assified on the basis of their positive or negative valence 
and colored words that need to be c1assified on the basis of their color. It is expected that 
performance (speed and accuracy like in the lAT and GNAT) will be superior in 
evaluatively consistent trials (i.e. pressing the key already assigned to a positive white 
attribute when encountering a colored positive target word) than in evaluatively 
inconsistent trials (i.e. pressing the key assigned to a negative attribute when encountering 
a colored positive word). This EAST task uses a sequence of five blocks (see Appendix 
8): (a) practice attributes in white (b) practice targets in blue and green (c) practice mixed 
colored and white words (d-e) test mixed colored and white words. The practice attribute 
block inc1udes aIl evaluative words in white. The practice colored target words inc1udes 
aIl 10 target words presented twice (each in blue and green). The practice mixed white 
and colored inc1udes aIl 10 evaluative words in white plus aIl 10 target words in both blue 
and green. Each test block inc1udes 60 trials of both white and colored words. Overall, 
each participant completes 180 trials. The blue color is created by setting the red, green 
and blue values at 0, 125, 150 respectively. The red, green and blue values for the green 
color were 0, 150, 125. As a result, the green and blue colors were very similar, and 
participants were wamed they are quite hard to discriminate. The default white color was 
used for evaluative words. AlI words were presented on a black background. 
Participants responded by pressing the "A" (pleasant) or "L" (unpleasant) keys 
with their left and right index fmgers. If the word was white, participants were told the 
46 
meaning of the word is important, and all of them had to press "A" when the word had a 
pleasant meaning and "L" when the word had an unpleasant meaning. If the word was 
colored, participants were told the color of the word is important. Half participants had to 
press "A" (associated with pleasant) for words in a blue-ish color and "L" (associated 
with unpleasant) for words in a green-ish color. The other half of the participants received 
the reverse color-response assignment. When participants made an error, a red X 
appeared under the word till the answer was corrected. Each word presentation was 
preceded by a white fixation "*,, for 500ms. Participants were asked to respond as fast 
(but also as accurately) as possible. 
GNAT. The Go-No Go Association Test (Nosek and Banaji, 2001) requires 
participants to respond to stimuli that represent the target category and the valenced 
attribute e.g. good (signal) and ignore other stimuli e.g. bad words (noise). Response 
latency and errors are compared between blocks presenting target + good and target + 
bad. The GNAT task was compounded of 8 blocks (see Appendix 9). First, four blocks of 
practice trials were presented at random. For one block, participants had to hit the 
spacebar for any words with a pleasant meaning (signal) and not to press any key for 
words with an unpleasant meaning (noise). Another block had the reverse assignment. A 
third block presented the brands related to one category (e.g. chocolate) as signal and the 
brands related to the contrasting category (e.g. yoghurts) as noise. A fourth block had the 
reverse assignment. Each practice block was compounded of 10 trials, such as all 
evaluative and target words would be used once as signal and once as noise. Next, 
another set of four blocks mixes evaluative and target words as signal and noise. These 
four blocks appeared in randomized order. Each of these test blocks was compounded of 
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70 trials, and was preceded by 8 trials used as practice. Each participant completed 352 
{rials in total. 
The ratio of signal to noise was set at 1: 1 for practice block, but 4:3 for test blocks 
to reduce the length of the test (see Nosek and Banaji, 2001, Experiment 3). Signal 
stimuli appeared for l000ms whereas noise stimuli appeared for 500ms (see Nosek and 
Banaji, 2001, Experiment 5). The reasons for this choice are: 1. Increase the possibility to 
catch words (hence, decrease the frustration associated with not catching enough words, 
especially taking into account the sample of non-students participants, not necessarily 
used to completing tasks on computers and playing video games) 2. Give the opportunity 
to use response latency in addition to errors as dependent variable. 
Participants received feedback on their accuracy. When they were correctly hitting 
a signal word or letting go a noise word, a green 0 appeared on the screen. When they 
were falsely hitting a noise word or letting go a signal word, a red X appeared on the 
screen, below the word. 
Evaluative Priming. The evaluative priming task (Draine and Greenwald, 1998) 
requires participants to classify attributes in bad or good categories while having a prime 
flashed right before appearance of the attribute. Response latencies are compared between 
consistent trials (i.e. categorizing a good word with a good prime) and inconsistent trials 
(i.e. categorizing a bad word with a good prime). The evaluative priming task was 
compounded of three blocks. During the frrst block of 20 trials, aIl attribute words were 
presented twice so as to be associated with a prime of each category (e.g. both with a 
chocolate brand and a yoghurt one). The next two blocks of 40 trials each were used as 
test. 
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Participants responded to words with a pleasant meaning by pressing the "Z" key 
with their left index fmger and thé "M" key with their right index finger. Immediately 
preceding each evaluative word, a word prime (either chocolate or yoghurt) appeared for 
200ms, followed by a blank screen for 1ooms. The words flashed were marginally 
perceptible. Participants were instructed not to pay attention to these words, and to 
respond to the final, c1early readable word. After each block, participants received 
feedback on their accuracy and their response latency. After the first test block, 
participants received the instruction that they were not going fast enough and should try 
harder. No error (cross) feedback was provided in the two test blocks until the end of the 
40 trial-blocks. 
Computer Assisted Explicit measures 
After the sequences of indirect measures, participants read on the screen that the 
next questions assess variables that could have an impact on the speed with which they 
categorized the words. Note that explicit questions administered right before choice does 
not affect the final choice (see Karpinski and Hilton, 2001 Experiment 2 with a choice 
between candy bars and apples). The explicit questions started with the overall 
assessment of the attitude toward yoghurt and chocolate (accessibility measures with 
positive and negative options). Afterwards, attitude and attitude strength scales 
(importance, certainty, and stability) were administered. Then the subjective and 
objective ambivalence questions appeared in a counterbalanced order. The questions 
about past behavior and behavioral intention appeared last. 
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Accessibility. Accessibility was measUfed for the attitude toward yoghurt (first in 
sequence) and afterwards through two questions on chocolate bars. The latency measUfed 
for yoghurt is used as a baseline to control for individual differences in response speed 
(Fazio, 1990). Only the E (negative) and 1 (positive) keys were active. Before starting the 
test, the experimenter showed the appropriate keys and highlighted that only the index 
fingers should be used. The participants practiced the keys before proceeding to the test. 
Before the blocks of question for which accessibility was assessed, participants saw a 
warning indicating that for the next few questions, time was recorded to provide for a 
baseline of their speed, and they should go as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Attitude scales. Attitude was assessed through "My attitude toward _ is" on 
three seven-point scales anchored by ''unfavorable-favorable'', "positive-negative" and 
"bad-good" (at random). Next, questions for the assessment of several attitude strength 
variables appeared at random. Attitude importance was assessed through two questions 
"How much do you care about" (anchored by not at alI-very much) and "How important 
is yOUf attitude toward __ to you, personally" (anchored by not at aIl important - very 
important). Attitude certainty was assessed through two questions "How confident are 
you in yOUf evaluation of' (anchored by not at aIl confident- very confident) and "How 
certain are you in yOUf evaluation of' (anchored by not at aIl certain - very certain). 
Attitude stability was assessed by three questions "How much do you think yOUf attitude 
varies from occasion to occasion" (anchored by "do not vary at aIl - vary a great deal"), 
"How stable is yoUf attitude toward" (anchored by not at aIl stable - very stable), "At 
times my attitude toward _ is more negative and at other times more positive" (anchored 
50 
by strongly disagree - strongly agree). Liking was assessed with one question "how much 
do you like" (7-point scale anchored with not at aIl- very much). 
Objective ambivalence. Positive and negative blocks of questions were 
counterbalanced. For the positive block, participants were asked to consider only the 
positive aspects and ignore the negative aspects of the product. Positive ambivalence was 
assessed through three questions on unidimensional6-point scales (see Thompson et al., 
1995): "How favorable is yOuf attitude toward" (from not at all favorable - very 
favorable), "My attitude toward_ is" (not at all good - very good), "How positive is 
yOuf evaluation" (not at aIl positive - very positive) in randornized order. Next, an open-
ended question appeared which required the participants to write all positive words that 
came to their rnind about the product. Next, two additional questions appeared at random, 
one is "How important are these positive aspects to yOuf evaluation of' (not at aIl 
important - very important) and one is "How relevant are these positive aspects to yOuf 
evaluation of' (not at aIl relevant - very relevant). The negative ambivalence questions 
were designed in the same fashion. Estimates of positive and negative evaluations will be 
combined into a numerical index using Griffm formula (for details, see description of the 
pilot study). 
Subjective ambivalence. Subjective ambivalence questions appeared in 
randomized order. For the cognitive aspects of subjective ambivalence, the questions 
were "1 have strong mixed thoughts toward chocolate bars _, both positive and 
negative, aIl at the same time" and "eating chocolate bars has disadvantages as weIl as 
advantages" (anchors strongly disagree-strongly agree). For the affective side, the 
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questions are "When 1 eat chocolate bars, 1 have conflicted feelings" and "When 1 eat 
chocolate bars, 1 fmd myself feeling tom" (anchors strongly disagree - strongly agree). 
Past behavior and behavioral intentions. Behavior was assessed through four 
questions in a fixed sequence. The first question is "How much do you des ire to eat _ at 
this moment" (anchors not at a11- very much). Then, ''To what extent do you expect to 
eat _ in the upcoming week" (anchors defmitively do not - defmitively do) and "How 
likely is it that you will eat _ in the upcoming week" (very unlikely - very likely). 
Fina11y, "How many _ do you eat on average in a week" (anchors 1 or less - 7 or 
more). 
Behavioral choice 
At the end of the section on the computer, participants were brought to another room 
where they were asked to make a choice between two products (i.e. a chocolate bar by 
Cadbury and a yoghurt in tube by Yoplait). These two products had the same convenience 
level (e.g. no spoon needed for the yoghurt) and similar perceptual aspect. Both products 
were also presented at the same price value per unit ($1.25). They were stored in the same 
ice-bag during the experiment and were not visible except when participants made their 
choice. Time taken to make their decision was below 5 seconds. 
Post-Choice Questionnaire 
After choice, participants had to fi11 out a last paper and pencil questionnaire 
compounded of a set of scales: Shiv and Fedorikhin's (1999) reasons for choice 7 point-
scales "My fmal decision about which snack to choose was driven by": my thoughts/my 
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feelings; my desirelmy willpower; my impulsive self/my prudent self; my rational 
side/my emotional side; my heart/my head; the Compensatory beliefs 10 items subscale 
(Knauper, Rabiau, Cohen, and Patriciu, 1994) and the Dutch Eating Behavior 
Questionnaire to assess typical eating hehaviors (Van Strien, Frijters, Bergers, and 
Defares, 1986). Participants also reported their level ofhunger, thirst and mood and a set 
of ancillary variables. 
2.2 Results study 1 
2.2.1. Analysis of implicit attitude measures 
The four implicit attitude measures were analyzed along their respective defined 
algorithms. It was expected that the four tests would indicate a positive implicit attitude 
toward chocolate and a more neutral implicit attitude toward yoghurts. 
lmplicit Association Test 
The analyses use Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003) improved scoring 
algorithm and proceed as described for the pilot study. The % of error in the test was low 
(6.38%) and will not he discussed further. Table 2 displays the average latencies 
(Av.Lat.) and the mean differences between the initial condition and the reversed 
condition (c and d and f and g steps) in log-transformed values (ConvLog.) and in 
milliseconds (ConvMs). d is the difference between block means divided hy the pooled 
standard deviation of latencies in the blocks. As can be noticed, there is a small lAT 
effect, showing an implicit preference in favor of chocolate bars compared to yoghurts. 
This lAT level is very similar to that found in the pilot test. 
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Table 2: Implicit attitude measures 
Av. Lat. ConvLog ConvMs D 
Yoghurt- 1151ms 0.1127 114.358 0.2733 
chocolate 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task 
Analyses were conducted according to the algorithm defmed by de Houwer 
(2002). Two participants were excluded from the analysis because they were defming 
themselves as color-blind. Eight additional participants were also removed because they 
did not fmish the test or started the test several times. Hence, analyses were conducted on 
N = 189. Reaction times below 300ms or above 3000ms were recoded to 300ms and 
3000ms respectively and reaction times on trials with an incorrect response were 
discarded. Latencies were log-transformed. We ca1culated the mean reaction time and the 
percentage of errors for trials on which chocolate bars and yoghurts were associated with 
extrinsically negative responses vs. extrinsically positive ones. Along de Houwer (2002), 
EAST scores were computed through deducting the means on trials with an attached 
positive response to the means on trials with an attached negative response i.e. a positive 
score indicating a positive attitude. 
The latency-EAST score for chocolate bars indicates a tendency toward a positive 
implicit attitude, Ms = 8.003 ms, t(188) = 2.131, P = 0.034, but nonetheless with a low 
Cohen's d of 0.0350. On the other hand, the latency-EAST score for yoghurt is clearly 
non significant, Ms = 1.201ms, t(l88) = 1.156, P = 0.249, d = 0.0052. The error-EAST 
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scores are non significant, neither for chocolate bars nor for yoghurts (respectively 
M=Û.9312, t(188)=1.313, p='Û.191 and M=O.6349, t(188)=1.004, p=O.316). The results on 
both dependent measures (latencies and error rates) tend to indicate a neutral implicit 
attitude toward yoghurts. The results for chocolate are non-significant, but they go in the 
direction of a more positive implicit attitude toward chocolate bars than towards yoghurts. 
Go-No Go task 
Analyses proceeded according to the algorithm defmed by Nosek and Banaji 
(2000). First, d-prime was calculated as fIfst dependent variable. D-prime indicates the 
ability to discriminate targets (or signal) from noise. Along Nosek and Banaji 
recommendation, empty cells due to false alarms or misses were replaced by a correction 
of 0.35 divided per 70 (number of eligible trials). Afterwards, d-prime was calculated as 
the difference in the proportion of hits (correct hit to signal) and faise alarms (incorrect 
hit for noises) for each of four combinations of targets (chocolate or yoghurt) and 
attributes (good or bad) as signaIs. Two individuals with d-prime values below 0 were 
removed from the analysis as this score indicate that either participants were unable to 
discriminate any signal from noise or they were not performing the task as they were 
instructed to. Hence, sensitivity analyses were conducted with N=197. 
As expected, sensitivity was greater when subjects were jointly discriminating 
chocolate and good from distracters (d'= 1.794) thanjointly discriminating chocolate and 
bad (d'=1.705, t(196)=2.656, p=O.009). This result suggests that chocolate and good are 
more strongly associated than chocolate and bad. On the other hand, when the target 
concept was yoghurts, there was no significant difference in sensitivity between yoghurts 
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+ good (d'= 1.692) and yoghurts + bad (d'=1.742, t(196)=-1.582, p=Ü.115). The GNAT 
corroborates the lAT results in favour of an automatic positive attitude towards chocolate 
and tends to indicate a rather neutral attitude toward yoghurts. In addition, a MANOV A 
demonstrates that sensitivity did not vary by the target concept (chocolate or yoghurts, 
F(1,196)=2.139, p=Ü.145) nor by the evaluative category (good or bad, F(1,196)= 0.591, 
p=O.443). The sensitivity score is a unique refIection of the association between category 
and valence (F(l,196)=11.353, p=O.OOl). 
Second, the latencies to categorize the target words when associated with bad 
compared to when associated with good were analyzed as second dependent variable. 
Reaction times were log-transformed and subsequent analyses are based on log-
transformed data, although presented in ms for meaningful purposes. The difference in 
reactions times when chocolate is associated with bad (Ms=587) and when chocolate is 
associated with good (Ms=544) is significant (t(l96)=7.517, p=O.OOO), indicating a 
positive attitude toward chocolate (Cohen's d=Ü.4134). On the other hand, for yoghurt, 
the difference in reactions time when yoghurt is associated with bad (Ms=547) vs. good 
(Ms=542) is non-significant (t(l96)=Ü.531, p=O.596), indicating a neutral attitude toward 
yoghurt (Cohen's d=O.0428). Overall for the GNAT, both dependent variables (sensitivity 
and latencies) are internally consistent and in line with the lAT and EAST results, with a 
positive implicit attitude toward chocolate and a neutral attitude toward yoghurts. 
Evaluative priming 
The evaluative priming analysis (Draine and Greenwald, 1998) was conducted on 
the two blocks serving as test blocks. Trials involving the chocolate brands as prime were 
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analyzed separately from trials using yoghurt brands as prime. For each prime category, 
the latencies taken by participants to categorize pleasant words compared to unpleasant 
words were analyzed. The hypothesis was that for positive primes, consistent trials would 
be faster (i.e. facilitated) compared to inconsistent trials. For chocolate as a prime, we did 
not find any significant difference between positive (Ms= 632) vs. negative trials 
(Ms=638) with t(198)=O.962, p=O.337. For yoghurts used as prime, we got similar results, 
with no significant difference between categorization of pleasant (Ms=648) vs. unpleasant 
(Ms=639) words (t(198)=-1.223, p=Ü.219).1 These results tend to indicate either that the 
attitude toward both chocolate and yoghurt is neutral or that the method selected (priming 
with words rather than pictures, speed chosen for the prime) is- not sensitive enough to 
detect differences between consistent and inconsistent trials for these product categories.2 
2.2.2 Differentiating ambivalent (rom dual attitudes 
In the following sections, hypothesis (Hl) that holding dual attitudes does not 
mean being any more ambivalent will be tested. AIso, analyses will intend to demonstrate 
that the difference between ambivalent and dual attitudes lie in a different endorsement of 
both evaluations (H2). Finally, the moderating effect of holding ambivalent and dual 
attitudes on the experience of subjective ambivalence (H3) is investigated. 
1 • Alilatencies were log-transformed and analyses proceeded on the transformed values. Results are 
presented in milliseconds in order to ease interpretation. 
2 . The results of this evaluative task will not be discussed further. 
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Correlations between measures 
The three measures of explicit attitude toward chocolate (alpha=O.966) and the 
three measures of explicit attitude toward yoghurt (alpha=O.947) were averaged. 
Afterwards an index of explicit preference toward chocolate was created by subtracting 
the attitude toward yoghurt from that of chocolate. This index allows the assessment of 
the correlation between the explicit preference and the lAT (Le. implicit preference). As 
one notices in the table 3, this correlation is not significantly different from zero 
(r=O.067). Similarly, the correlations between the explicit attitude toward chocolate and 
the two implicit attitude measures (GNAT, r=-0.076 and EAST, r=-0.098, p > 0.10) are 
near to zero. Nonetheless, the correlations between the lAT and the GNAT as well as 
between the lAT and the EAST are significant at p=O.OOO, even if the internal consistency 
between these three measures remains low (alpha=O.3738). Altogether, these results are in 
line with expectations of an implicit -explicit dissociation for chocolate. 
Table 3: correlations between explicit and implicit attitude measures 
Explicit Attitude lAT GNAT EAST 
Preference 
Explicit preference 1 0.731 0.067 -0.047 -0.009 
Attitude 1 -0.003 -0.076 -0.098 
lAT 1 0.323 0.192 
GNAT 1 0.072 
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Dual and non-dual clusters 
The GNA T measurement was selected to analyze dual attitudes toward chocolate. 
First, this test is intemally consistent for both the chocolate and the yoghurt (see section 
2.2.1) and it correlates significantly with the widely used lAT. Second, contrary to the 
IA T, it assesses the implicit attitude toward chocolate separately from yoghurt (i.e. it 
delivers an implicit attitude rather than an implicit preference). 
A K-means cluster analysis was conducted in order to identify groups of 
participants holding dual attitudes toward chocolate. Three homogeneous groups were 
created on the basis of the explicit attitude toward chocolate (mean attitude, 
F(2,194)=184.605, p=O.OOO) and the implicit attitude (GNAT chocolate, 
F(2,194)=37.478, p=O.OOO). The three clusters could be interpreted as grouping dual 
positive (explicit positive and implicit negative, N=24), dual negative (explicit negative 
and implicit positive, N=38) and non-dual subjects (N=135). Table 4 displays the fmal 
cluster centers. In addition, 1 compared the scores for each cluster on two additional 
implicit measures, the lAT and the EAST. Although the difference on these variables is 
Dot significant between groups (IAT, F(2,194)=1.126, p=O.326; EAST, F(2, 184)=1.406, 
p=O.248), the direction of effects is consistent with the results on the GNAT. 
Table 4: Cluster centers on explicit and implicit attitude measures 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Dual + Dual- Non dual 
Mean attitude 6.68 2.54 5.74 
GNAT-d -0.63 0.29 0.64 
IAT-d 0.16 0.30 0.29 
EAST-d -0.02 0.15 0.01 
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Objective ambivalence 
Hypothesis 1 was predicting that holding dual attitudes does not imply being any 
more ambivalent. To test this hypothesis, an index of objective ambivalence was 
computed through combining estimates of positive (alpha=O.809) and negative 
(alpha=O.807) evaluations using the Griffm Similarity-Intensity fonnula ((P + N)/2 -Ip-
NI) (Thompson, Zanna and Griffm, 1995). A oneway ANOVA indicates that the three 
clusters do not differ on this measure of objective ambivalence (F(2,194)=O.966, 
p=O.382). As shown in table 5, neither cluster 1 (dual +) nor cluster 2 (dual-) are more 
ambivalent compared to cluster 3 (non dual). There is even a tendency to be less 
ambivalent when being part of the cluster 1 (dual positive), although the difference with 
the two other clusters is not significant. Overall, these results give credit to the frrst 
hypothesis (Hl) that holding dual attitudes is not related to ambivalence when 
ambivalence is measured objectively (through computation of positive and negative 
evaluations ). 
Table 5: Summary of Griffm ambivalence index for dual and non dual clusters 
Mean S.D. 
Cluster 1- Dual + 1.368 1.808 
Cluster 2- Dual - 2.013 1.899 
Cluster 3- Non dual 1.818 1.768 
Total 1.801 1.798 
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Relevance and importance of positive and negative bases of evaluation 
Hypothesis H2 was predicting that ambivalent and dual attitudes entail a different 
endorsement of the positive and negative bases of evaluation. In order to test this 
hypothesis, two groups were created (i.e. high and low in ambivalence; see for instance 
Armitage and Conner, 2000) according to a median split (median = 1.833). 
A MANOV A was conducted on the importance and relevance of the positive and 
negative bases of evaluation introducing as fixed factors the 3 clusters (non dual, dual 
with positive explicit and dual with negative explicit) as weIl as the two ambivalence 
groups. On one hand, there is a main effect of ambivalence on the negative basis of the 
evaluation, the negative basis of evaluation being more important and relevant for the 
high ambivalence group compared to the low ambivalence group (respectively 
F(l,l9l)=l4.l83, p=O.OOO and F(l,l9l)=l4.700, p=O.OOO). On the other hand, the 
ambivalence level has no effect neither on the importance nor on the relevance of the 
positive basis of evaluation (respectively, F(1,191)=O.784, p=O.377 and F(1,191)=O.OOO, 
p=O.987). Yet, overall, as expected (H2.l), results show that in the high ambivalence 
group, bases of evaluation are equally endorsed i.e. there is no significant difference 
between importance and relevance of the positive and negative bases of evaluation for the 
group high in ambivalence (p >0.10). 
However, there is no clear support for hypothesis H2.2 that when holding dual 
attitudes, one basis of evaluation is more important and relevant. Actually, there is a main 
effect of the cluster membership on both the importance and relevance of the negative and 
positive bases of evaluation (respectively for importance F(2,19l)=2.380, p=O.095 and 
F(2,l91)=4.213, p=O.Ol6; for relevance, F(2,191)= 5.217, p=Ü.006 and F(2,19l)=4.098, 
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p=Ü.018). A post-hoc test using Hochberg's GT2 procedure (due to inequality in cluster 
sample sizes) indicates differences between the dual negative group and the non-dual 
group, with the negative basis of evaluation being both more important and relevant for 
the dual group (respectively mean difference= 0.89, p=Ü.047 and 1.17, p=Ü.003) and the 
positive basis of evaluation being less important and relevant (respectively mean 
difference=-0.76, p=Ü.049 and -0.87, p=Ü.014). These results indicate that dual attitudes 
tend to involve bases of evaluation that are equally endorsed. 
Finally, there is no interaction between cluster memberships and ambivalence, 
neither for the negative basis (F(2,191)=Ü.441, p=Ü.644 for importance and 
F(2,191)=Ü.116, p=Ü.890 for relevance) nor for the positive basis (F(2,191)=Ü.355, 
p=Ü.702 for importance and F(2,192)=Ü.867, p=Ü.422 for relevance). 
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Overall, these results partially support the second hypothesis. Ambivalence involves 
equivalent endorsement and importance of both positive and negative bases of evaluation 
(H2.1). Nonetheless, when dual, there is no c1ear support that one basis of evaluation is 
considered as more important and legitimate (H2.2). Actually, for dual negative, it even 
appears that both bases are equally important and relevant. An additional and rather 
unexpected result lies in the difference in importance and relevance of the negative basis 
between participants high in ambivalence (compared to low) and participants holding 
dual attitudes (compared to non dual). This result points out the role played by negativity 
in the activation of an attitudinal conflict (see general discussion). 
Subjective ambivalence 
In order to test hypothesis H3 that ambivalent and dual attitudes do not lead to the 
same experience of tension (measured as subjective ambivalence), the four items 
measuring subjective ambivalence were averaged (alpha= 0.8067) and an ANOVA was 
conducted on this variable with objective ambivalence and duality as fixed factors. 
Neither ambivalence nor duality had a main effect on subjective ambivalence 
(respectively, F(1,193)= 1.275, p=O.260 and F(1,193)=O.654, p=O,420). Yet, the 
interaction between ambivalence and duality is significant (F(1,193)=10.550, p=O.OOl). In 
the low ambivalence group, participants are more subjectively ambivalent when they are 
dual compared to when they are non dual (contrast estimate difference in means 0.955, 
p=O.007). In the high ambivalence group, participants tend to be less subjectively 
ambivalent when they are dual compared to non-dual (contrast estimate difference in 
means -0.574, p=O.077). These results suggest that high ambivalence leads to an 
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experience of tension (when being non dual), giving credit to H3.1. But, contrary to the 
prediction H3.2, holding dual attitudes also leads to an experience of tension (when non 
ambivalent). It appears that in both cases individuals are aware that they experience a 
conflict and feel discomfort with it. 
Figure 5: Subjective ambivalence 
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2.2.3 Measures of attitude strength 
In the following analyses, hypotheses H4 to H6 on the moderating effect of 
ambivalent and dual attitudes on measures of attitude strength (accessibility, stability and 
certainty) are tested. For these analyses, the valence of the duality is not relevant. 
Consequently, analyses are conducted on the whole group of 62 dual participants (cluster 
1 and 2) in order to get a bigger sample size, more comparable to that of non dual. 
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Attitude Accessibility 
Hypothesis H4 was predicting that attitudes would be slower to retrieve at higher 
levels of ambivalence and that duality would be a moderator, with attitudes being even 
less accessible when being dual in addition to ambivalent. In order to test this hypothesis, 
attitude accessibility, measured as the latencies in ms, was analyzed along Fazio's (1990) 
recommendations. The attitude responses provided during the dichotomous tasks were 
compared to those given on the seven-point Likert scale measure for which speed of 
responding was not an issue. For yoghurt (filler measure, frrst in sequence), 183 (out of 
186) answers were correctly identified as positive or negative both in the forced choice 
and on the measure on scale, which results in an "error rate" below 2%. For the 13 
answers in the middle point on the scale (exactly 4),8 were negative and 5 positive in the 
reaction task. For chocolate bars (two measures), 174 (out of 178) answers were correctly 
identified as both positive or negative, which results in a low "error rate" of 2.25%. For 
the 21 answers on the middle point of the Likert scale (exactly 4), 15 turned out to be 
negative in forced choice and 6 positive. Altogether, these results indicate a good 
correlation between the responses recorded under time pressure and those taken on 
traditional Likert scales (respectively phi=O.895 for yoghurts and 0.902 for chocolate 
bars). It also provides an indication that responses on the middle point, which might be 
considered as neutral or ambivalent tend to display a negative orientation. 
Second, the response latencies were analyzed (see figure 6). Response latencies 
below 500ms were recoded to 500ms, as it might indicate that the subject answered 
without reading the question. These responses were rare for the first item (below 2%) and 
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accounted for 6% of aIl responses for the second chocolate item. As the attitude toward 
yoghurt was measured frrst in sequence, the answers were much slower (mean=2776 ms, 
S.D. 1279ms) than the focal measures for chocolate (mean=1395 ms, S.D. 557 ms). 
Along Fazio (1990)'s recommendations, the latency measures for yoghurt (filler item) 
provided a means of controlling for individu al differences in speed of responding when 
eliciting an attitude, and served as a covariate in the subsequent analyses. The latency 
measures for attitude toward chocolate bars (alpha=O.618) and attitude toward yoghurt 
were log-transfonned in order to make the mean a more accurate reflection of the central 
tendency of the skewed distribution. However, the following results are presented on non-
transfonned latencies to ease interpretation. 
An ANCOV A was conducted on the mean latency for attitude toward chocolate, with 
objective ambivalence (median split) and dual status (dual or non dual) as between-
subject factors, and the latency measure for yoghurt as covariate. There is a main effect of 
the covariate measure (F(1,192)=31.889, p=O.OOO), a main effect of the ambivalence 
factor (F(1,192)=12.951, p=O.OOO) and an interaction effect of ambivalence X duality 
(F(1,192)=5.805, p=O.017). The main effect of duality was not significant 
(F(1,192)=1.303, p=O.255). A contrast analysis demonstrates that the attitude toward 
chocolate is less accessible at higher levels of ambivalence (contrast estimate difference 
in log-transfonned means 0.193, p=O.OOO) and at higher level of ambivalence, it is even 
slower to retrieve when subjects have a dual attitude toward chocolate compared to when 
they are non dual (contrast estimate in log-transfonned means 0.180, p=O.018). 
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These results corroborate hypothesis H4. Ambivalence is a moderator of accessibility, 
with attitudes being longer to retrieve at higher levels of ambivalence. In addition, at high 
levels of ambivalence, holding dual attitudes increases the time taken for the explicit 
attitude to be retrieved. 
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In order to test hypotheses H5 and H6 on the moderating role of ambivalence and 
duality on attitude stability and certainty, the two items measuring attitude stability 
(alpha=O.7129) and attitude certainty (alpha=Ü.8653) were averaged and the aggregated 
measures were used as dependent variables in a MANOV A with ambivalence and duality 
as fixed factors. For both attitude stability and attitude certainty, ambivalence had a 
significant main effect (F(1,193)=7.344, p=O.OO7 and F(1,193)=7.326, 
p=O.OO7respectively) and duality no main effect (F(1,193)=O.41O, p=Ü.523 and 
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F(1,193)=O.255, p=O.614). The interaction effect was not significant for attitude stability 
(F(1,193)=O.OO2, p=O.964) yet there was an interaction for attitude certainty 
(F(1, 193)=5. 134, p=O.025). As illustrated by the two graphs below (figures 7 and 8), the 
attitude is more likely to vary (more unstable) at higher levels of ambivalence and duality 
is not a moderator. A contrast analysis also demonstrates that the attitude is held with less 
certainty at higher levels of ambivalence (contrast estimate difference in means -0.627, 
p=O.OO7), especially for those non-dual subjects (contrast estimate difference in means 
0.642, p=O.050). 
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H5 and H6 are fully supported for ambivalent attitudes. Ambivalence has a moderating 
effect on both attitude stability and attitude certainty, with attitudes being less stable and 
less certain at higher levels of ambivalence. For dual attitudes, it appears as predicted that 
duality is not a moderator of attitude stability (H5.2). Yet for certainty, dual attitudes are 
held with more certainty at higher levels of ambivalence (contrary to predictions) and 
tend to be less certain at lower levels of ambivalence (H6.2). 
2.2.4 Predictors ofchoice 
In this section, the hypothesis 8 and 9 on the interplay between the implicit and 
explicit attitude in predicting volitional vs. spontaneous choice and the moderating effects 
of holding dual and ambivalent attitudes are tested. The two measures of behavioural 
intention for chocolate bars (alpha=Ü.945) and for yoghurts (0.951) were aggregated and 
formed an index of deliberative choice (as proxy) and the actual binary choice between 
the yoghurt stick and the chocolate bar was entered as measure of spontaneous choice1• 
First, the influence of the explicit preference, the implicit preference (lAT) and the 
implicit attitude toward chocolate (GNAT) on spontaneous and deliberative choice were 
fitted separately, respectively through a logistic and a linear regression model. Duality 
and ambivalence group membership were inc1uded as moderating categorical variables. 
Second, to be able to test the full model (with both spontaneous and deliberate choice as 
outcomes), obtain an overall test of goodness of fit and take into account measurement 
error (especially for the implicit measures), a structural equation approach was adopted. 
1 Overall, in the binary choice task, 59.3% of participants chose the chocolate. 
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The logistic regression model predicting the actual choice performs fairly well 
with these five predictors (chi-square(5)=45.839, p=O.OOO) and helps predict 70.6% of the 
choices. There is a marginally significant influence of the duality group (odds=O.471, 
Wald=3.296, p=O.059) and, as predicted (H7.1), there is a significant influence ofboth 
the explicit preference (odds=1.449, Wald=17.614, p=O.OOO) and the implicit preference 
lAT (odds=2.728, Wald=5.300, p=O.021) in determining the fmal (spontaneous) choice. 
In addition, conforming to H7.2., there is no effect of the ambivalence group on choice 
(Wald=1.850. p=O.174). Finally, there is no main effect of the GNAT measure 
(Wald=2.151, p=O.142). The differential influence of each variable between the dual 
groups was investigated further through entering each variable in the form of interactions. 
This model does not make a major improvement on the previous model with main effects 
only (72.6% of choices correctly predicted). The orny significant interaction is the Dual X 
GNAT interaction (odds=2.914, Wald=5.072, p=O.024) which indicates an increased 
influence of the implicit attitude toward chocolate on choice in the group of dual 
participants, in line with the hypothesis H7.3. 
In parallel, the linear model predicting the ''volitional'' choice between the 
chocolate and the yoghurt was fitted (R=O.640, Adjusted R2 = 0.394, F(5, 191)=26.536, 
p=O.OOO) and indicates no effect of the dual (p=O.291) or ambivalent (p=O.547) variables, 
and no significant influence of the lAT (p=O.315) or the GNAT (p=O.566). The only 
significant influence on deliberative choice is the explicit preference (B=O.664, t=1O.985, 
p=Û.OOO), which gives credit to H8.1. 
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The structural equation model predicting simultaneously the spontaneous and the 
deliberative choice was fitted using the Mplus software l . First, a Confmnatory Factor 
Analysis was conducted to assess the existence of a latent implicit construct with the three 
measures (lAT, GNAT and EAST) as measurement items (see Cunningham, Preacher and 
Banaji, 2001, for confmnatory factor analysis on implicit measures). Unfortunately, the 
measurement model performed badly, with a CFI of 0.26. It appears that none of the three 
indirect measures introduced in the modelload significantly on one latent construct 
(estimate/S.E. from 0.526 to 0.548, p>O.lO). The correlation between the implicit and 
explicit measures does not reach significance either (estimate/S.E. 0.109, p>O.lO). 
Consequently, the lAT and the GNAT were introduced as separate constructs in the 
model. This new model is theoretically justified by the structural difference between both 
implicit tests, the lAT assessing the implicit attitude toward chocolate relative to a 
contrast category (Le. an implicit preference) and the GNAT measuring the "implicit 
attitude toward chocolate" in more absolute terrns. A full model assessing the influence of 
both implicit and explicit measures on spontaneous and deliberate choice was fitted. The 
fit of this model is excellent, with a non significant chi-square (p=O.67) and a CFI close to 
1 (CFI=O.99). Nonetheless, because these traditional measures of fit have a rather low 
power to reject a model with binary outcome (Yu and Muthen, 2002), two additional 
indicators of goodness of fit were taken into account, the RMSEA and the WRMR. Both 
indicated a very good fit, with a RMSEA close to 0 (RMSEA=O.OOl) and a WRMR 
below 0.9 (WRMR=O.072). As expected (see figure 9), the implicit preference (lAT, 
estlS.E.=4.802, p=O.Ooo) in addition to the explicit preference (estlS.E.=1.99, p=O.05) 
1 • At the time the analyses were conducted, Mplus is the only software allowing the introduction of binary 
categorical outcomes in a structural model. 
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contribute to the prediction of the spontaneous choice. The deliberative behaviour is 
signifi-.::antly influenced by the explicit preference only (est/S.E.=2.48, p=Ü.Ol). 
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Figure 9: Structural model of implicit and explicit influence on choice 
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Second, the model was fitted simultaneously on the two groups of dual and non 
dual. Again, the fit of the model was good (CFI=O.99, RMSEA=O.OOO, WRMR=O.671). 
For the group of non dual, the implicit measures have no significant influence, neither on 
spontaneous choice. nor on deliberate choice (p>ü.lO). Yet, the explicit preference has a 
significant influence on spontaneous choice (std estimate=O.508, est/S.E.=3.367, 
p=O.OOO) as well as on deliberate choice (std estimate=O.158, est/S.E.=1.952, p=Ü.05). 
For the group of dual, spontaneous choice is influenced by the explicit preference (std 
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estimate=O.370, est./S.E.=2.061, p=O.04), the implicit preference (lAT std 
estimate=O.404, est./S.E.=2.135, p=O.03) and marginally the implicit attitude toward 
chocolate (GNAT std estimate=O.158, est/S.E.= 1.768, p=O.09), the explicit preference 
still being the only predictor of deliberate choice (std estimate=O.145, est./S.E.=4.875, 
p=O.OOO). 
Third, the model was tested simultaneously on the high vS.low ambivalence 
groupSl. The mode! also fits the data very weIl, with a significant chi-square (p=O.63), a 
CFI of 1, an RMSEA of 0.000 and a WRMR of 0.598. In the group Low in ambivalence, 
the explicit preference determines both the spontaneous (std estimate=O.515, est./S.E.= 
3.615, p=O.OOO) and deliberate behaviour (std estimate=O.186, est./S.E.= 1.981, p=O.05). 
In the group High in ambivalence, the explicit preference is not significantly influencing 
deliberate behaviour (std estimate=Ü.129, est./S.E.=1.096, p>O.lO). Yet, spontaneous 
behaviour is influenced by both the explicit preference (std estimate=O.492, 
est./S.E.=3.398, p=O.OOO) and the implicit preference (std estimate=O.153, 
est./S.E.=2.382, p=O.02). 
OveraIl, the results support H7 and H8 on the different influence of implicit and 
explicit attitudes in driving spontaneous and more deliberate choice. It appears that the 
spontaneous choice is influenced by both the implicit and the explicit attitude (H7). In 
addition, the implicit attitude influences spontaneous choice more when in the context of 
an attitude conflict (holding ambivalent or dual attitudes). AIso, in line with the 
1. At the time the analyses are conducted, Mplus does not allow the specification of more than one grouping 
variable. 
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predictions (H8), the deliberate behaviour (behavioural intention as proxy) is only 
influenced by the explicit attitude, with no moderating effect of holding dual attitudes. 
Yet, at high levels of ambivalence, the relation explicit attitude and deliberate choice is 
not significant. 
2.2.5. Dual attitudes and individual eating behaviors 
The following sections explore individual differences that might partially explain the 
existence of dual attitudes. Particularly, differences between dual clusters on the Dutch 
Eating Behavior Questionnaire are assessed (van Strien et al. 1986). No formal 
hypotheses are proposed. Yet, it is expected that restrained eaters be more likely to hold 
dual attitudes toward chocolate (positive implicit but negative explicit) than non 
restrained eaters. 
The Dutch Eating Behavior Questionnaire 
A maximum likelihood factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted on the 33 
items extracted from the DEBQ (KMO = 0.914; Bartlett's p=O.OOO). 5 items had to be 
discarded in order to get the three expected factors and increase the reliability. The three 
factors extracted could be interpreted as restrained (9 items, eigenvalue= 10.661), 
emotional (13 items, eigenvalue = 4.415) and extemal/situational eating (6 items, 
eigenvalue=2.604). Together they explain 63% of the total variance. It has to be noted 
that the situational eating factor is the weaker (4 out of five items discarded were on this 
factor) with the lowest reliability (0.87 compared to 0.92 for restrained eating and 0.95 
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for emotional eating). This might be due to the fact that these four questions were the four 
last questions in the experiment. 
The means on each subscale (scales 1-5) on the total number of participants were for the 
restrained scale 2.346 (S.D. 0.900), for the emotional scale 20425 (S.D. 0.907) and for the 
situational scale 3.529 (S.D. 0.746). 
Describing the clusters with individual variables 
A discriminant anal ysis was carried out in order to determine how the clusters 
differ on a set of individual difference variables, including age and gender as weIl as the 
three dimensions of the D.E.B.Q. (restrained eating, emotional eating and situational 
eating). A problem of multi-collinearity among the variables was identified, restrained 
eating being correlated with emotional eating (r=Oo433), age (r=O.174) and gender 
(r=O.343), and in addition emotional eating being correlated with situational eating 
(r=Oo406) and gender (r=O.301) and situational eating with age (r=-0.198) at p < 0.05. 
Thus, an orthogonal principal component analysis was conducted and the resulting 
components were introduced as independents in the discrimination function analysis. The 
univariate ANOV As show that the 3 clusters differ significantly on two variables, 
restrained eating (F(2,194)=5.992, p=O.OO3) and situational eating (F(2,194)=3.691, 
p=O.027). Two discriminant functions were obtained. The frrst function accounts for 
92.2% of the total among-groups variability. The second accounts for the remaining 
7.8%. To interpret these functions, we turned to the standardized discriminant 
coefficients. The frrst function is most heavily weighted on the factor restrained (coef. = 
0.693) and negatively weighted on the factor situational eating (coef. = -0.523). The 
second function is most weighted on the factor situational (coef. = 0.577). Table 6 
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presents the group means on the discriminant functions and the five component scores. 
Cluster 1 (dual with a positive explicit and negative implicit attitude) is mostly described 
by the situational eating variable and marginally the emotional eating variable. Cluster 2 
(dual with a negative implicit and a positive explicit) is mostly described by their 
restrained eating status and marginally this group is older and more feminine. The 
discriminant function helped classify correctly 42.1 % of original grouped cases (with just 
guessing a success rate of 33% would have been expected). 65.8% of cluster 2 and 37.5% 
of cluster 1. 
Table 6: description of each cluster with individual variables 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Dual + Dual- Non dual 
Discriminant function 1 -0.279 0.790 -0.173 
Discriminant function 2 0.292 0.002 -0.005 
Restrained eating -0.125 0.501 -0.111 
Situational eating 0.285 -0.366 0.032 
Emotional eating 0.218 -0.121 -0.003 
Gender 0.019 0.287 -0.085 
Age 0.014 0.291 -0.086 
Classification results demonstrate that knowledge of people's eating behavior 
increases the ability to predict what clusters (especially dual positive or negative toward 
chocolate) individuals belong to. It is interesting to notice that being dual negative or 
being dual positive does not lead to the same eating behaviours. Whereas dual negative 
individuals are more restrained. dual positive tend to be more extemaVsituational eaters 
(influenced by the environment and social settings). This result is particularly intriguing 
and difficult to explain. It might be that those having a tendency to be influenced by 
extemal cues have intemalized that chocolate is not good for their weight but justify their 
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social behaviours through a positive attitude. Or these people might be health conscious, 
but with no serious weighr problems. On the other hand, those who have a tendency to 
control more their eating behaviour and refrain from eating certain food try to convince 
themselves that chocolate is not good for them. 
Main differences between the restrained and non restrained group 
Although there is no conventional eut-off for the restrained subscale of the DEBQ, 
it was decided to include as restrained eaters those participants with an average superior 
to three out of five on the restrained scales (n=47), which seems conservatory taking into 
account a median of 2.333. With these two subgroups (restrained-non restrained) 
identified, a cluster X restrained status tabulation was computed (see table 7), which 
shows significant differences between restrained groups (chi-square (2)=11.358, 
p=Ü.OO3), with restrained eaters being more frequently dual (especially negative) toward 
chocolate than non-restrained eaters. 
Table 7: freguency of duals in restrained and non restrained eaters 
Non Restrained (n = 150) Restrained (n=47) 
Cluster 1 dual + (n = 24) 12.7% 10.6% 
Cluster 2 dual - (n = 38) 14.0% 36.2% 
Cluster 3 non dual (n = 135) 73.3% 53.2% 
Table 8 summarizes the main differences on explicit and implicit variables 
between restrained and non-restrained eaters, The restrained eaters have a significantly 
more negative explicit attitude toward chocolate (mean difference = - 0.98, 
F(1,197)=12.990, p=Ü.OOO). There is also a significant difference between both groups in 
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terms of explicit preference between the chocolate and the yoghurt (F(1,197)= 14.118, 
p=Ü.OOO)). Restrained eaters display a marked preference toward the yoghurt. In addition, 
restrained eaters display a more positive implicit attitude toward chocolate than non 
restrained eaters (d-IAT = 0.367 vs. 0.250 p=Ü.OOO; d-GNAT = 0.514 vs. 0.382, p=Ü.OOO). 
Yet, they are not anymore ambivalent than non-restrained eaters (F(1,197)=Ü.300, 
p=Ü.585). 
Turning to choice, there is a significant difference in the deliberative choice 
between both groups (F(1,197)=3.195, p=Ü.075), with a higher intention to choose the 
yoghurt for restrained than non restrained eaters (F(1,197)=3.533, p=Ü.062). Nonetheless, 
there are no differences in the real choices made subsequently between the restrained and 
non restrained eaters (F(1,197)=1.726, p=O.191). OveralI, 59.3% of participants choose 
the chocolate bars, 51.1 % among the restrained eaters group and 61.8% among the non-
restrained eaters group. This result highlights a discrepancy between the behavioural 
intention of restrained eaters and their subsequent, "more impulsive", choice. 
Table 8: implicit and explicit variable means for restrained and non restrained eaters 
Restrained eaters Non restrained eaters 
Attitude chocolate 4.489 (SD 1.920) 5.467 (SD 1.524) 
Preference -1.262 (SD 2.437) 0.211 (SD 2.321) 
IAT-d 0.367 (SD 0.432) 0.250 (SD 0.394) 
GNAT chocolate-d 0.514 (SD 0.926) 0.382 (SD 0.730) 
EAST chocolate-d 0.004 (SD 0.418) 0.047 (SD 0.522) 
Deliberative choice -0.766 (SD 2.531) 0.054 (SD 2.339) 
Ambivalence chocolate 1.918 (SD 1.911) 1.754 (SD 1.757) 
AlI together, these results indicate that restrained eaters have a tendency to be 
more dual toward chocolate than non restrained eaters. It appears that their explicit 
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attitude toward chocolate is less positive than that of non-restrained eaters, whereas their 
implicit attitude is generally more positive (both when measured on the lAT and on the 
GNAT). 
2.3. Summary 
Overall, these results indicate that ambivalence and duality are two distinct forms 
of attitude conflict (Hl). Yet, it appears that, in both cases, the positive and negative 
bases of evaluation are equally important and relevant, and participants experience the 
feeling to be conflicted, giving partial credit to hypotheses H2 and H3. It appears that 
participants are aware of their contradictions in both cases, when ambivalent and dual. 
In addition, fmdings in the ambivalence literature on the weakness of explicit 
attitudes based on ambivalence (H4.1 to H6.1) are corroborated. Explicit attitudes are less 
accessible, less stable and less certain at higher levels of ambivalence. It appears also that 
duality is a moderator for attitude accessibility and certainty at higher levels of 
ambivalence. Attitudes are even longer to retrieve (i.e. less accessible) when they are both 
dual and ambivalent (H4.2.), yet they are also more certain. 
Finally, hypotheses H7 and H8 are fully supported. Both implicit and explicit 
attitudes drive spontaneous behaviour whereas only explicit attitude influence deliberate 
choice. The influence of the implicit attitude on spontaneous choice seems amplified 
when a conflict (either ambivalence or duality) exists in attitudes. 
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Based on these findings, it is likely that the form of duality encountered in the 
context of food is similar to that of motivated overriding (Wilson et al. 2000) where 
people are fully aware that they have two implicit and explicit attitudes. Yet, ultimately, 
these people seem to deny one aspect oftheir attitude. The context of restrained eating 
appears to be ideal to study the processes yielding to dual attitudes. 
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CHAPTER III: Follow up study - The case of restrained eating 
Results from Study 1 indicated that restrained eaters would be more likely to hold 
a dual attitude toward chocolate (negative explicit attitude and positive implicit attitude) 
than non-restrained eaters. This second study uses restrained eating as context in order to 
explore the processes leading to holding dual attitudes. It is hypothesized that restrained 
eaters inhibit (or override) their positive implicit attitude toward certain products, which 
they deny eating or liking. Nonetheless, this implicit attitude might influence restrained 
eaters' eating choices in circumstances when they lose control on their behavior. This 
follow up study also gives the opportunity to study changes in implicit and explicit 
attitudes after direct experience with a food item, with a view to evaluate means to reduce 
attitude conflicts. Finally, the interplay between implicit and explicit attitudes in 
influencing spontaneous and controlled behavior is investigated further with different 
choice options compared to study 1. 
1. Conceptual foundations 
1.1. Is holding dual attitudes the consequence of inhibition? 
Wilson et al. (2000)' s form of duality which is referred as motivated overriding is 
comparable to a phenomenon widely studied in psychology as inhibition. In psychology, 
the term inhibition describes a decrease in the activation or accessibility of a mental 
representation or the blocking of a particular mental process (Anderson and Spellman, 
1995; Brendl, Markman and Messner, 2003; Fitzsimons and Shiv, 2001) and disinhibition 
would arise from "Iessened controls on response inclinations" (Gorenstein and Newman, 
1980, p. 302). Motivated overriding entails inhibition as people block access to an 
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implicit attitude they view as illegitimate or unwanted and replace it by an attitude which 
they believe to be good or instrumental with respect to their goals. For instance, 
Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel and Schaal (1999, Study 4) showed that chronic 
egalitarians have the same stereotype representations as non-chronics, but both groups 
differ in their goals. "Implicitly activated egalitarian goals allow chronics not merely to 
prevent stereotypes from being activated but to inhibit the stereotype prior to activation". 
This process requires motivation and cognitive capacity. 
Self-regulating behaviors, such as restraining eating, precisely involve managing a 
conflict between strong inhibiting and strong instigating pressures. Polivy' s (1998) 
seminal article provides a comprehensive review on behavioral inhibition and the conflict 
involved between the desire to suppress, and to perform, a behavior (e.g. eating a favorite 
food when on a diet). Similarly, Ward and Mann (2000, p. 753) state, "Restrained eating, 
like the inhibition of the most pleasurable activities, entails self-regulation, an overriding 
of a normal response through the substitution of a competing response". Accordingly, 
this group is more likely to experience dual attitudes toward a number ofhigh-fat 
products (e.g. a positive implicit attitude toward "forbidden" food and a negative explicit 
attitude conforming to their diet), compared to non-restrained eaters. A robust observation 
by nutritionists is that when restrained eaters break their diet, not only do they eat much 
more than they should, taking into account their commitment to a diet, but also their 
choice invariably goes in favor of foods high in calories, and forbidden in the context of 
their diet. Typically, restrained eaters and bulimics tend to report dislikes in preference 
studies for food considered forbidden or "dangerous" because they are high in calories 
and especially in fat content, but paradoxically, these forbidden foods are those eaten in 
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excess when restrained eaters release from self-imposed control and break their diet 
(Kales, 1990; Vartanian, Polivy and Herman, 2004). Although the overeating of 
restrained eaters during disinhibited episodes has been widely documented, the 
mechanism driving their choice in favor of these forbidden food is yet largely unknown. 
It is assumed that through repeated dieting episodes, restrained eaters have self-
conditioned themselves to express preferences in line with their diet and block access 
(inhibit) to their original inclination in favor of food higher in calories. 
When restrained eaters are motivated and have the cognitive capacity to override their 
temptations, they control their eating and their food choices whereas when they release 
from self-imposed control they make choices dictated by their impulses (Baumeister, 
Heatherton and Tice, 1994). A breakdown of cognitive control is involved in disinhibitive 
episodes, when restrained eaters increase their food consumption contrary to their usual 
caloric restriction (e.g. Ward and Mann, 2000). For instance, the use of disinhibitors such 
as food pre-Ioads, dysphorie mood or alcohol consumption was successful in rendering 
restrained eaters to lose their cognitive control over their food consumption, leading to 
overeating. The "food pre-Ioad effect" is one of the best documented failures of self-
regulation processes. After consuming a high-fat milkshake, restrained eaters consume 
more calories in the preload condition whereas, in contrast, non-restrained eaters tend to 
consume fewer calories than in the control condition (Kirschenbaum and Dykman, 1991; 
Knight and Boland, 1989; Herman and Mack, 1975). Mitchell and Epstein (1996) also 
demonstrated that stress has disinhibitive effects. Following a Stroop task used as a 
stressor, restrained eaters increased their food consumption whereas non-restrained eaters 
decreased their consumption compared to the control group (Mitchell and Epstein, 1996). 
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An interesting parallel could be drawn with the disinhibition involved in alcohol drinking. 
In Dermen and Cooper (2000)'s research, a1cohol decreases condom use only in 
individuals that have highly conflicted feelings about condoms. The researchers advocate 
that alcohol might interfere with access to distal, instigatory cues for condom use (e.g., 
fear of AIDS) whereas it does not impede access to proximal cues (e.g., sexual pleasure). 
Ward and Mann (2000) demonstrated that a simple cognitive load such as a memory 
test is sufficient to obtain overeating in restrained eaters. They exposed restrained and 
non-restrained eaters to a high-calorie food while they were occupied with a recognition-
memory task (high cognitive load condition) or a simple reaction-time task (low cognitive 
load). In the high-cognitive load condition, restrained eaters were more under instigating 
pressure (focusing on the attractiveness of the food) and engaged more in disinhibited 
eating compared to the low cognitive load condition. In contrast, non-restrained eaters ate 
less food in the high-cognitive load condition compared to the low cognitive load 
condition. In 2004, Ward and Mann extended their work by demonstrating that under 
limited attention capacity, the behavior of restrained eaters is influenced by the salience 
of the cues instigating consumption or inhibiting it. In the high cognitive load condition, 
restrained eaters ate more when the attractiveness of the food was salient than in a 
situation in which their diet was made salient (Mann and Ward, 2004). Altogether, these 
results tend to indicate that cognitive load plays a role in the incapacity to override 
responses based on instigating cues in restrained eaters. Similarly, cognitive load might 
impede the capacity of restrained eaters to retrieve the explicit attitude that relates to their 
internaI goals (losing weight). For instance, Monahan and Laliker (2002) had participants 
evaluate a confederate under high or low cognitive load after subliminal affective 
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priming, positive, negative or neutral. Results show that participants were more affected 
by the subliminal priming task when under high cognitive load. Koole, Dijksterhuis and 
van Knippenberg (2001) found a correspondence between implicit self-esteem (positive 
bias towards the letter of one's name) and self-reported self-evaluation only under time 
pressure (study 3) and cognitive load (study 4). In the domain of consumer decision 
making, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999; 2002) tested the effect ofrestricting cognitive 
resources on the choice between an alternative associated with more positive affect (a 
chocolate cake) and one associated with more positive cognitions (a fruit salad). Findings 
suggest that when resources are restricted, lower-order affect arising from more automatic 
processes might have higher impact on choice (leading to higher likelihood to choose the 
chocolate cake). On the contrary, when resources are not restricted, higher-order affect 
arising from more controlled processing might have more influence, leading to higher 
likelihood to choose the fruit salado 
In this follow up study, the prediction that non-conscious processes influence 
immediate choice when restrained eaters are under high cognitive load, but that they are 
more likely to make a choice influenced by more deliberative processes when more in 
possession of their cognitive capacities is investigated. 
Hypothesis 9: Restrained eaters under high cognitive load should be more Iikely to 
choose a food item forbidden in their diet than when under low cognitive load. Non-
restrained eaters should be less affected by the manipulation. 
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Hypothesis 10: The spontaneous choice of restrained eaters should be more 
influenced by the implicit attitude under high cognitive load than under low 
cognitive load. Non-restrained eaters should be less affected by the manipulation. 
1.2. Reducing attitudinal conflicts through direct experience 
Reducing duality involves a change in the implicit attitude to increase the 
correspondence with the explicit attitude, or change the explicit attitude to relate more 
with the implicit, or both. The general assumption is that explicit attitudes are less 
resistant to persuasion compared to implicit attitudes, which are supposed to be slow to 
form and change, as they are the product of long-term exposure to particular associations 
(Wilson et al., 2(00). Yet, a number of recent articles seem to suggest that implicit 
attitudes might be more malleable than theoretically conceived (Blair, Ma and Lenton, 
2001; Brinol et aL, 2002; Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001; Lowery, Hardin and Sinclair, 
2(01). Lowrey et al. (2001) induced a shift in automatic attitudes toward ethnic 
individuals through positive interpersonal contacts, demonstrating hereby that implicit 
attitudes can be quite malleable and dependent on situational factors. Dasgupta and 
Greenwald (200 1) also obtained changes lasting for 24 hours, on implicit preferences for 
White over Black American and Young over OIder people by exposing participants to 
pictures of admired or disliked instances of the categories, without any changes on 
explicit attitudes. Dijksterhuis (2004) enhanced implicit self-esteem in individuals 
through subliminal evaluative conditioning. Last, Blair et al. (2001) results suggest that 
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implicit stereotypes might be influenced by controlled strategies such as 
counterstereotypic mental imagery. 
Altogether, these results provide evidence that implicit attitudes might change at 
least temporarily by exposing subjects to particular exemplars of the ethnie groups or 
activating links opposed to the implicit attitude. Yet, it is not c1ear whether implicit 
attitudes might be changed through exposure to counterpersuasive messages or direct 
experiences. Rudman, Ashmore and Gary (200 1) report a significant decrease in both 
implicit and explicit negative attitudes toward black people in students attending a 
semester of multicultural training. Especially, implicit change seemed to follow an affect-
based route (through fear reduction, friendship etc.), which tends to indicate that 
emotional conditioning or reconditioning might be effective for an implicit attitude shift 
(cf. also Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, and Russin, 2000). Tomala, Brmol and 
Petty (2004) also report an effect of persuasive messages encouraging consumption of 
vegetables at the implicit level without changes in explicit attitude (study 1). Nonetheless, 
persuasive ads seem to affect also the explicit attitude, via the confidence of participants 
in their evaluation (study 2). 
Yet, no research indicate that implicit food attitudes, which might be based on 
sensorial and emotional factors deeply rooted in family and cultural traditions, might be 
changed. Habituation to new flavors seems to occur through repeated tasting (Sakai, 
Kataoka and Imada, 2001; Sullivan and Birch, 1990). Birch and his colleagues (1990; 
Birch, McPhee, Steinberg and Sullivan, 1990) provide evidence for the conditioning of 
food preferences in children and adults through repeated experience and tasting. If 
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repeated exposure has a conditioning effect on explicit attitudes and preferences, it could 
also be effective in modifying attitudes at the implicit level. Indeed, implicit attitude 
formation and change was obtained for new products through a c1assical conditioning 
procedure without awareness of participants (OIson and Fazio, 2001; 2002; Ohme, 2001). 
However, direct experience and repeated tasting seems to affect restrained and 
non-restrained eaters in different ways. In Mitchell and Epstein (1996)' s study using 
Yoplait yogurt as target food, restrained eaters showed an increased liking of the yogurt 
which they repeatedly tasted whereas non-restrained eaters showed a reverse pattern with 
decreased liking related to boredom. Zandstra, Graaf and van Trip (2000) also report a 
boredom effect in a group of normal subjects which repeated once a week for ten weeks 
the consumption of a meat sauce, which created a substantial decrease in acceptance and 
attitude ratings. In the same way, the attitude of restrained and non-restrained eaters 
might be differentially affected by repeated exposure and tasting of a food item. 
In this research, restrained and non-restrained eaters are exposed to two direct 
experience tasks: a comparative test (within-subjects pre-post test) and the repeated 
tasting of a reduced-fat OREO cookie for ten days (between-subjects test vs. control). 
Restrained eaters are expected to display a negative implicit attitude toward the reduced-
fat product before the repeated exposure and a more positive implicit attitude after the 
repeated exposure. AIso, repeated tasting should foster the strength of the explicit attitude 
in restrained eaters, with attitudes being less ambivalent and more certain toward the 
reduced fat. 
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Hypothesis Il: 
HU.l. Direct experience with the food item will be effective in modifying the 
implicit attitudes. 
HU.2. Direct experience with the food item will strengthen explicit attitudes: 
attitudes will be less ambivalent and more certain after direct experience with the 
food item 
HU.3. The restrained eating status will be a moderator of the effectiveness of direct 
experience. Direct experience will be more effective in reducing attitude conflict for 
restrained compared to non-restrained eaters. 
2. Method study 2 
The hypotheses presented in the preceding sections were tested in a two-session 
laboratory experiment. In the frrst session, access to cognitive resources was manipulated 
through a cognitive load manipulation with a group of restrained and a group of non 
restrained eaters. It was expected that restrained eaters in the high cognitive load 
condition (i.e. disinhibitive effect; see Ward and Mann, 2000) would make a choice 
influenced by their implicit preference whereas they should make a choice more related to 
their explicit preference in the low cognitive load condition. Non-restrained eaters should 
be less affected by the manipulation. After ten days of repeated tasting, a second session 
was organized to assess changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. 
2.I.Focal attitude object 
The focal attitude objects for this study are OREO cookies in two varieties, 
reduced fat and double crème (or double stuff). OREO cookies are familiar to Canadian 
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residents (pre-test N=20 females, mean= 2.70 on seven-point scale -3/3). The varieties 
double crème and'reduced-fat seem equally familiar but less weIl known (pre-test n=20 
females, mean= 0.85 for reduced-fat and 1.15 for double crème, t(19)=O.688, p=O.500). 
Yet, the associations linked to both products are very clear, the reduced-fat option linked 
with the notion of low calorie and the double crème with that of rich and tasty treats (see 
pre-test words for the lAT in Appendix 14). Hence, these varieties allow a real 
dichotomous choice based on the same product category (cookies), same brand (OREO) 
but with varieties of which, one is a better option with regards to pleasure and the other a 
better option with regards to health considerations. 
Fat in food is an issue which elicits strong attitudes. Tuorila, CardeIlo, and Lesher 
(1994) demonstrated that even though consumers had never tasted specifie fat-free food 
in the past (i.e. cake, crackers and cheese), they had strong (negative) expectations on the 
taste of these products. In addition, the difference in attitude and behavioral intention 
toward reduced fat products (cakes and chocolate in particular) between restrained and 
non-restrained is weIl documented (see Tuorila, Kramer and Engell, 2001; Kahkonen and 
Tuorila, 1999), with restrained eaters more positive toward reduced fat products and more 
likely to choose them over regular alternatives than non restrained eaters. 
2.2. Study overview. 
The design of this second study is a 2(high Ilow restrain) X 2(high cognitive loadl 
low cognitive load) between-subjects design. In addition, direct experience is 
manipulated within-subjects in a pre-post test (session 1) and between-subjects (repeated 
tasting for ten days vs. control group). 
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The procedure presented in figure 10 was tested in a pilot study (n=20). Participants start 
with completing an lAT, a GNAT and a series of explicit measures. Next, dis inhibition is 
manipulated through high cognitive load in half of the participants with a memory test 
task. Next, participants taste both products to assess any influence on indirect and direct 
measures after a comparative assessment of both products. It also helps us conform to the 
cover story (i.e. the influence of mental tasks on taste perceptions). At the end of the 
session, participants are administered the implicit and explicit measures again. 
Afterwards, the same group is split in two subgroups and allocated different tasks to 
complete everyday (control, repeated tasting) for ten days. Participants are rescheduled at 
the end of the ten day period for a new session similar to the fIfst one with direct and 
indirect measurement, cognitive load manipulation and choice. 
Figure 10: Summary of experimental procedure used in Study 2 
Screening phase 
Demographies 
Restrained statu~ 
Session 1 
IATI-GNATI 
Direct measures 
~ 
Cognitive load Repeated tasting 
Manipulation ~ 
~ (10 days) 
Choice 
~ 
Taste test 
~ 
IAT2-GNAT2 
Direct measures 
Session 2 
IAT3-GNAT3 
Direct measures 
~ 
Cognitive load 
Manipulation 
~ 
Choice 
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2.3. Sample 
Women were pre-screened over the phone fifteen days before the beginning of the 
study to be perfectly fluent in English, to have a correct vision and not suffering from 
diabetes or any food allergies. In addition, all of them were selected to have knowledge of 
the brand OREO cookies (see Appendix 15). The Revised Dietary Scale (Hennan and 
Polivy, 1980) was embedded in the set of questions. Participants were c1assified as 
restrained or non-restrained eaters on the basis of their score on this restrained scale: 
women with a score above 16 out of 35 (conventional cut-off) were considered as 
restrained eater. 133 women attended the first part of the research in the lab (on 
computer); yet 128 women completed the frrst session in full. Of the 128 women who 
completed the study, 61 scored 16 or above on the Revised Restrained Scale and were 
considered as restrained (mean=19.98, sn 3.088) whereas the rest was grouped as non-
restrained (mean=9.81, sn 3.162). Within each group, women were randomly allocated 
to one of two conditions, high load (30 restrained and 31 non-restrained) and low load (31 
restrained and 36 non-restrained), with no differences between restrained groups (chi-
square=O.109, p=O.742). Among these 128 women, 120 participated in the second 
session, 61 repeating the tasting of a reduced-fat OREO cookie for ten days and 59 
perfonning the same task with a social tea cookie. Before each session, women were 
requested to refrain from eating and drinking for an hour, in order to monitor the same 
level of hunger and thirst. Measures of hunger and thirst were taken at the beginning of 
each session and were used as covariates in each analysis. If not mentioned, these 
variables are not significantly affecting the results. 
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2.4. Procedure 
Laboratory sessions. 
Participants were tested individually. Upon entering the experimental room, aIl 
participants completed the lAT and the GNAT (counterbalanced) in order to assess their 
implicit preferences between double crème ORBO and reduced-fat OREO cookies. They 
also reported their explicit attitude toward both products (attitude, attitude certainty and 
attitude ambivalence measured on unipolar scales) and their behavioural intention toward 
each ORBO variety on computer in the same procedure as study 1. 
Next, participants took a memory test. Words (countries in the frrst session and 
animaIs in the second sessions) were displayed in the middle of the screen, each for 5 
seconds, and participants had to memorize these words. One group of participants (low 
cognitive-Ioad condition) had to memorize two words (e.g. Indonesia and Mexico), 
whereas the other group (high-cognitive load) had to memorize 8 words. Mterwards, 
participants were offered a choice between a box of double crème OREO cookies and a 
box of reduced-fat ORBO cookies. During the experiment, participants could not see the 
boxes of cookies which were hidden in the drawers of the experimenter' s desk. After the 
choice, participants filled out a post-choice questionnaire (see Appendix 16) and 
participated in the taste test. After having tasted both cookie types, participants wrote 
down the words they had to memorize. Hence, participants put effort in remembering the 
words for a maximum of 15 minutes. Last, participants completed a second lAT and 
GNA T and a second set of explicit measures. 
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IATandGNAT 
Pre-test words. The five words chosen to describe the category double crème 
OREO ("rich", "taste", "cream", "treat", "indulgence") and the five words chosen to 
describe the category reduced-fat OREO ("low calorie", "low fat", "diet", "light", 
"moderation") were pre-tested among 20 women to be equally familiar (on a seven-point 
scale anchored by -3 to 3, set reduced-fat = 2.75 and set double crème = 2.72, t(19)= 
0.429, p=Ü.673) and be equally associated with the target category and dissociated from 
the contrasting category (on a seven-point scale from strongly associated with double 
crème to strongly associated with reduced-fat, t(19)= 0.092, p=O.928) (see Appendix 14). 
Procedure. The same procedure as in Study 1 was used. 
Cognitive load manipulation check: 
After making their choice, participants had to describe, as completely as possible, 
whatever went through their minds while they were deciding between the two cookie 
types (see Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999). The thought protocols were coded by two 
independent judges for the total number of thoughts. Along Shiv and Fedorikhin's(1999) 
procedure, any statement representing evaluations or descriptions of the food options, 
thoughts about the task, or prior experience with the options, or consequences of choosing 
one or the other option (e.g. on their weight), description of CUITent state (hungry or 
thirsty) were coded as thoughts (aIl statements fell into one of these categories). Inter-
rater agreement was high (96%) and discrepancies were resolved through discussion. A 
between-subject ANOV A with cognitive load condition as independent variable reveals 
that the manipulation was successful both in the flIst and second session. In the flIst 
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session (F(1,126)=23.457, p=O.OOO), participants reported an average of 3.02 thoughts 
(SD 2.062) in the high cognitive load condition vs. 4.49 (Sn 1.245) in the low cognitive 
load. In the second session (F(I,118)=8.732, p=O.004), participants reported an average of 
2.98 thoughts (SD 1.712) in the high cognitive load condition vs. 3.89 (SD 1.641) in the 
low cognitive load. 
The level of concentration needed during each cognitive load condition was 
assessed through asking the question «How much did you have to concentrate in order to 
remember these words?". As expected, there is a significant difference on the level of 
concentration involved between the high load and low load œnditions for both sessions 
(F(1,126)=33.274, p=O.OOO and F(1 , 117)=27.710, p-=O.OOO). The high load condition was 
involving more concentration on remembeting the words and was likely to impede more 
the participants' cognitive capactties than the low load condition (in session 1, 
mean=4.69, SD 1.698 Vs. mean=2.97, SD 1.669 and in session 2, mean=4.29, SD 1.717 
vs. mean=2.75, SD 1.468). 
Direct experience tasks 
Taste test: In session 1, after making their choice, participants were presented with 
two bowls, each containing 10 cookies of each OREO type. Participants were instructed 
to sample as many cookies as they needed in each bowl. In order to conform to the cover 
story (i.e. influence of mental tasks on taste perception), they had to rate the taste of the 
cookies (in counterbalanced order, see questionnaire Appendix 16). In addition, this 
comparative task was used to assess changes in the implicit and explicit attitude after 
direct experience (and comparison) with both OREO cookie types. 
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On-going repeated exposure. At the end of the first session, half of the 
participants were offered a box with 10 reduced-fat OREO'cookies to be eaten every day 
at the same hour. The second and control group was offered a box of 10 social tea 
cookies. AlI participants had to filI out the same taste rating questionnaire everyday (see 
Appendix 17). They also provided an estimate on their level of mental occupation during 
the day (in order to enhance the coyer story). AlI participants were rescheduled for a 
second session ten days later. 
3. Results study 2 
3.1. Evolution ofimplicit and explicit attitude measures over time 
In order to test Hypothesis lIon the influence of direct experience on implicit and 
explicit attitudes, the GNAT, lAT and the explicit measures (attitude, attitude certainty 
and attitude ambivalence) were analyzed at three points in time, at the beginning of the 
first session, after the taste test (end of session 1) and after the repeated tasting (session 
2). For session 1 (time 1), it was expected that participants would display a positive 
implicit attitude toward the double crème but a negative implicit attitude toward the 
reduced fat. In addition, it was expected that the explicit attitudes of participants be 
affected by the restrained status, restrained eaters being more positive toward the reduced 
fat option but more negative toward the high fat option than non restrained eaters. With 
direct experience, it was expected a favourable evolution of the implicit attitude toward 
the reduced fat option as well as a strengthening of the explicit attitude (more certain, less 
ambivalent) especially for restrained eaters. 
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Go-No Go task 
Participants undertook three GNAT tests, one at the beginning of the first session 
(time 1,133 participants), one at the end of the second session (time 2, 128 participants) 
and one at the beginning of the second session (time 3, 120 participants). Analyses 
proceeded as explained in study 1. Results are detailed for time 1 but they are presented 
in a synthetic format for time 2 and 3. 
GNAT time 1: d' (d prime) values were fIfSt assessed for the four blocks, reduced fat + 
good or bad and double crème OREO + good or bad. As expected, sensitivity was greater 
when subjects were jointly discriminating double crème and good from distracters (d'= 
1.67) thanjointly discriminating double crème and bad (d'=1.59, t(132)=2.040, p=O.04). 
This result suggests that the double crème OREO and good are more strongly associated 
than double crème and bad. When the target concept was reduced fat, sensitivity was 
greater when subjects were jointly discriminating reduced fat and bad from distracters 
(d'=1.65) than whenjointly discriminating reduced fat and good (d'=1.60) yet the 
difference is not significant (t(132)=-1.448, p=O.150). On this dependent measure, results 
indicate that overall subjects tend to display a rather negative implicit attitude toward 
reduced fat OREO cookies (although not clearly significant) and a positive implicit 
attitude toward the double crème version. In addition, a MANOV A demonstrates that 
sensitivity did not vary by the target concept (reduced fat or double crème, 
F(1,132)=O.077, p=O.782) nor by the evaluative category (good or bad, F(1,132)= 0.047, 
p=O.828). The sensitivity score is a unique reflection of the association between category 
and valence (F(1,132)=4.384, p=O.038). 
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Second, the latencies to categorize the target words when associated with bad 
compared to when associated with good were analysed as second dependent variables. 
Reaction times were log-transformed and subsequent analyses are based on log-
transformed data, although presented in ms for greater ease of interpretation. If reactions 
times when double crème OREO is associated with bad (Ms=682) and when double 
crème OREO is associated with good (Ms=622) are compared the difference is significant 
(t(132)=5.284, p=O.OOO), indicating a positive attitude toward the product (Cohen's 
d=O.444). For reduced fat, the difference in reactions time when reduced fat OREO is 
associated with bad (Ms=596) vs. good (Ms=625) is also significant in the opposite 
direction (t(132)=-2.877, p=O.005), indicating a negative implicit attitude toward reduced 
fat OREO (Cohen's d=-O.222). 
In terms of differences between conditions, a MANOV A with restrained status as 
between-subject factor indicates no difference between groups on the implicit (negative) 
attitude toward the reduced fat OREO (F(1,124)=1.408, p=O.238) but a more positive 
implicit attitude for the restrained participants in favour of the high fat OREO 
(F(1,124)=5.803, p=O.017; d=O.653 for restrained vs. d=O.241 for non-restrained) 
Overall both dependent variables (sensitivity and latencies) are intemally consistent and 
indicate, as was expected, a positive implicit attitude toward double crème OREO and a 
negative implicit attitude toward reduced fat OREO. In addition, the implicit attitude 
toward the high fat OREO is significantly more positive for restrained eaters. 
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Comparison between tests: The three GNAT tests go in the same direction, on both 
dependent variables, indicating a positive implicit attitude toward the high fat OREO and 
a negative implicit attitude toward the reduced fat OREO. 
For the high fat OREO, there is a main within-subject effect of time between time 1 and 
time 2 (F(1,122)=5.308, p=O.023) as weIl as an interaction effect with the restrained 
status (F(1, 122)= 4.040, p=O.047). This indicates that the implicit attitude is more 
positive toward the high fat OREO at time 2 vs. time 1 (Le. after the tasting session), 
especially for the non-restrained eaters. Between time 2 and 3, there are no significant 
within-subject effect oftime (F(l, 1,109)= 0.945, p=O.333) nor any significant interaction 
effects. 
For the reduced fat OREO, there is no within subject effect of time (F(l, 122)= 0.195, 
p=Ü.660) nor any significant interactions between time 1 and 2. The within-subject time 
effect is also not significant between time 2 and 3 (F(1,109)= 1.538, p=O.218), as are none 
of the interactions between factors and conditions. 
Table 9: GNAT measures over time 
Time 1 Time2 Time3 
D' (HF + Good) 1.673 1.793 1.896 
D' (HF + Bad) 1.595 1.687 1.694 
D latencies HF 0.444 0.705 0.503 
D' (RF + good) 1.603 1.677 1.711 
D' (RF + bad) 1.650 1.793 1.839 
D latencies RF -0.222 -0.105 -0.113 
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Overall, the GNAT appears to be a very stabie measure over time. Contrary to 
expectations, direct experience has no effect on this measure for the reduced fat option. 
For the high fat option, it appears that there is a favourable evolution after tasting and 
comparing the product for the group of non restrained eaters only. 
Implicit Association Test 
The lAT was administered at three points during the experiment, at the beginning 
and at the end of the frrst session as weIl as at the beginning of the second session, with 
exactly the same block order within-subjects. Analyses for these three measures 
proceeded as described in Study 1. The overall % of errors was below 10% in the three 
tests. Conforming to expectations, the d measures for the three tests (d l =O.5426, 
d2=O.3984 and d3=O.3971) indicate a more positive implicit attitude toward the high fat 
OREO than vs. the reduced fat OREO, with no differences between the restrained groups 
(p >0.182 in the three tests). 
Between time 1 and time 2, a repeated measure MANOV A demonstrates there is no 
significant main effect of time within-subjects (F(l,121)= 1.635, p=O.204) nor any effects 
ofrestrained status (F(l,121)=O.045, p=O.833) or cognitive Ioad (condition 1, 
F(l,121)=O.015, p=O.903). In addition, interactions between factors are not significant. 
The same phenomenon replicate between time 2 and time 3. There is no main within-
subject effect oftime (F(l,107)=1.180, p=O.280), nor any effect of the restrained status 
(F(l, 107)=1.704, p=O.195) or the experimental conditions (high vs low load, F(l,107)= 
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1.472, p=O.228; repeated tasting, F(1,107)=O.532, p=O.467). It seems that the lAT 
measure is very stable within-subjects, as none of the experimental conditions -C contrary 
to predictions) is influencing the measure. 
Between the lAT and the GNAT measures, there are no significant correlations 
during the frrst session but the measures tend to increasingly correlate with time. In the 
first session, the correlations are between the lAT and the GNAT high fat r=O.131 
(p=O.143) and between the lAT and GNAT the reduced fat r=-O.142 (p=O.llO). In the 
frrst session time 2, the correlations are for the lAT and GNAT high fat r=O.108 
(p=O.227) and lAT and GNAT reduced fat r=-O.283 (p=O.OOl). In the second session, 
IAT and GNAT high fat r=O.395 (p=O.OOO) and IAT and GNAT reduced fat r=-O.232 
(p=O.Oll). 
Evolution of explicit measures over time 
Four measures conceming the explicit attitude were taken at the three points in time: the 
attitude toward the double crème and reduced fat OREO cookies, the attitude certainty 
(for both products), the ambivalence (measured on both positive and negative evaluation 
combined into Griffin index for both products) and the behavioural intention. 
A MANOVA conducted on the data at time 1, i.e. before the administration of the 
experimental conditions, demonstrate that there are no differences between restrained and 
non restrained eaters on any of the variables for the high fat OREO. However, in line with 
the expectations, aIl four variables are significantly different between restrain groups for 
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the reduced fat OREO. Restrained eaters have a more positive attitude toward reduced fat 
OREO (F(1,126)=8.156, p=Û.OO5), are more certain in their evaluation (F(1,126)=5'()04, 
p=Û.027) and they also are significantly less ambivalent toward these products 
(F(1,126)=4.562, p=Û.035). In addition, restrained eaters have a higher intention to buy 
reduced fat OREO cookies (F(1,126)=5.130, p=Û.025). 
Between time 1 and time 2, there is no within-subject effect of restrained group or 
cognitive load condition on any variables for the high fat OREO. For the reduced fat 
OREO, there is a marginally significant within-subject effect of the restrained status on 
ambivalence (F(1,122)=3.242, p=Û.074), with a reduction of the ambivalence level among 
the non-restrained eaters after having eaten the reduced fat OREO cookie (amb1=1.9179, 
sn 1.481; amb2=1.399, sn 1.502), but without any influence on their overall evaluation 
of the product (p >O.lO). 
Between time 2 and time 3, there is no within subject effect of restrained group or any 
experimental condition for the high fat OREO. For the attitude toward reduced fat OREO, 
there is a significant within-subject interaction between the restrained factor and the 
repeated-measure factor (F(1,113)=6.394, p=Û.013). The non-restrained eaters in the 
repeated exposure experimental condition have a more positive attitude toward reduced 
fat OREO at time 3 compared to time 2 (mean attitude2= 4.533 sn 1.364 vs. mean 
attitude3= 3.783 sn 1.617). In addition, there is a within-subject effect of the repeated-
measure condition on both the attitude certainty (F(1,109)= 3.328, p=Û.041) and the 
attitude ambivalence (F(1,109)=7.831, p=Û.OO6). In the condition in which participants 
had to eat reduced fat OREO for ten days, the attitude certainty is higher and the attitude 
ambivalence is significantly reduced. 
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In summary, hypothesis Il is not fully supported. First, the direct experience 
manipulation was not successful in significantly changing participants' implicit attitude 
(Hll.l.). The implicit attitude toward reduced fat is not affected, neither for restrained 
nor for non restrained eaters. The implicit attitude toward the high fat is affected for non 
restrained eaters only, which might indicate that the implicit attitude is less resistant to 
change when it is not implicitly denied and when it is endorsed at the explicit level. 
Nonetheless, supporting hypothesis Hll.2., direct experience has an influence on explicit 
attitudes in that the explicit attitudes are significantly more certain and less ambivalent 
toward the reduced fat option after the repeated tasting. 
2.2.2. Influence ofimplicit vs. exp/icit attitude measures on rea/ choice 
During the fIfSt and second session, half of the restrained and non-restrained 
groups were assigned to either a high cognitive load condition or a low cognitive load 
condition. The hypothesis HW was that in the high cognitive load condition, restrained 
eaters would be more likely to choose a high fat OREO, in line with their implicit attitude 
whereas in the low load condition, they would control their choice better (more in favour 
of the reduced fat) and would be more influenced by their explicit attitude. Results for 
each session are presented below. 
Session 1 
During the fIfst session, 53% of participants chose the high fat ORBO vs. 47% 
chose the reduced fat. A logistic regression with restrained status and cognitive load 
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condition levels as predictors and choice between the double crème and the reduced fat as 
dependent indicates differencés both between restrained group and conditions (chi-
square(3)=11.885, p=O.008). In line with expectations, there is a main effect of cognitive 
load, with an increased likelihood to choose the high fat option overthe reduced fat in the 
high load condition (odds=2.209, Wald=4.474, p=O.034). There is also a main effect of 
the restrained status on choice, with restrained eaters being more likely to choose the 
reduced fat over the high fat cookie (odds=O.370, Wald=7.059, p=o.008). Nonetheless, 
the interaction between restrained status and cognitive load condition is not significant 
(odds= 1.600, p=O.530), although it was expected that restrained eaters would be more 
likely to choose the high fat cookie under high cognitive load (H9). 
Figure 11 : % choices for restrained eaters- session 1 
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In order to test the influence of the implicit and explicit attitude on spontaneous 
choice (HW), a second logistic regression was conducted. The explicit preference, the 
implicit preference (lAT), the implicit attitude (GNAT) toward high fat and reduced fat 
OREO were introduced as predictors of choice. The restrained status and the cognitive 
load condition were also introduced as categorical predictors. The model fits the data very 
weIl (chi-square(7)=53.483, p=O.OOO) and helps predict 80.2% of the choices. 
Corroborating the results of study 1, both the explicit preference (odds=2.198, 
Wald=19.017, p=O.OOO) and the implicit preference (lAT, odds=2.458, Wald=3.073, 
p=O.080» have an influence on spontaneous choice. The implicit attitude toward the 
reduced fat option (GNAT) is never significant, neither as main effect nor as interaction. 
The implicit attitude toward the high fat is not significant as main effect. However, in line 
with hypothesis HlO, there is a restrained X condition X GNAT high fat interaction 
(odds=6.W9, Wald=8.020, p=O.005), with the implicit attitude toward the high fat option 
being more influential for restrained eaters in the high load condition. 
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In paraIlel, to replicate the results of study 1 on the influence of the explicit 
preference on deliberate choice (difference in behavioural intention as proxy), a linear 
regression was fitted. The explicit preference, the implicit preference (lAT), the 
ambivalence levels and the two implicit attitude measures (GNAT) were entered into the 
model simultaneously. The model performs fairly weIl (R=O.505, adjusted RZ=O.218, 
F(6, 119)=6.802, p=O.OOO). Findings are in line with the results obtained in study 1. The 
only significant predictor of "volitional" choice is the explicit preference between the 
high fat and reduced fat OREO (b=O.395, t=4.650, p=O.OOO). 
Session 2 
The same analyses as in session 1 were conducted on the results of the second 
session. At the end of this second session, 55% of the participants chose the high fat 
OREO and 45% chose the reduced fat. A logistic regression was conducted in order to 
analyze meaningful differences between groups and conditions. The model with main 
effects and interactions is significant (chi-square(7)=24.697, p=O.OOO). There is a main 
effect of restrained status (odds=O.484, Wald=3.059, p=O.080), a main effect of cognitive 
load condition (odds=4.675, Wald=13.524, p=O.OOO) and an interaction effect between 
cognitive load condition and restrained status (odds=4.214, Wald=3.507, p=O.061). These 
results give credit to hypothesis H9; the likelihood to choose the high fat option is higher 
for restrained participants in the high load condition compared to the low load condition. 
In addition, the effect of the second condition (direct experience) is not significant 
(odds=O.674, p=O.343) although the means go in the direction of eating reduced fat 
increases the likelihood to choose the reduced fat option. None of the other interactions 
are significant (p>O.15). 
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A second logistic regression was assessed with the introduction of the explicit 
preference, the lAT, and both GNAT as predictors, plus the restrained and cognitive load 
status. The model performs slightly less weIl than in the frrst session, but is nonetheless 
significant (chi-square(7)=37.299, p=Ü.OOO with 71.2% choices predicted). The explicit 
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preference is still a good predictor of choice (odds=1.508, Wald=11.512, p=Ü.OOl), the 
implicit preference (lAT) has still a marginally significant influence (odds=1.868, 
Wald=2.850, p=Ü.091) and both GNAT measures do not reach significance as main 
effects. Yet, the increased influence of the implicit attitude (GNAT) toward the high fat 
option in the restrained X high cognitive load group compared to the other groups is still 
significant (odds=8.135, Wald=4.954, p=Ü.026). This result corroborates that obtained 
during the flIst session, and gives strong support to hypothesis 10. The implicit attitude 
toward the high fat option is more influential for restrained eaters in high cognitive load 
condition. 
In line with the results obtained in study 1 as weIl as during the flIst session, the 
model to predict "volitional" choice also fits the data very weIl (R=Ü.643, adjusted R2= 
0.414, F (6,111) =13.044, p=Ü.OOO), with still the strong influence of the explicit 
preference on deliberate choice (b=Ü.515, t=6.888, p=Ü.OOO). In addition, the two 
ambivalence variables have a significant influence on the intended choice, in opposite 
direction (for ambivalence toward high fat, b=-0.290, t=-3.641, p=Ü.OOO; for ambivalence 
toward reduced fat, b=Ü.252, t=3.123, p=Ü.OO2). 
OveraIl, these results give credit to H9 and HW. Restrained eaters are more likely 
to choose the high fat alternative, in line with their implicit attitude, when under high 
cognitive load than when under low cognitive load. Non restrained eaters are less affected 
by the manipulation. These fmdings also replicate those obtained in the flISt study, with 
both implicit and explicit preference influencing spontaneous choice, whereas only the 
explicit preference is significantly impacting deliberate choice 
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Chapter IV: General discussion 
1. Main findings 
1.1. Ambivalent and dual attitudes 
This research tests empirically the hypothesis suggested by Wilson and colleagues 
that ambivalent and dual attitudes are different constructs, leading to different attitudinal 
conflicts. Study 1 was entirely designed to investigate the main differences between dual 
and ambivalent attitudes. First, it was c1early demonstrated that holding inconsistent 
implicit and explicit attitudes (i.e. having dual attitudes) does not lead to being any more 
ambivalent (measured objectively). Following Wilson et al. (2000), it appears that 
individuals might hold two separate evaluations of an attitude object, with different 
valences, without recognizing that they are both positive and negative toward this object. 
(i.e. objective ambivalence). However, participants seem to be subjectively aware of the 
existence of an internaI conflict, which they express in the form of subjective 
ambivalence. Participants report being conflicted (holding mixed beliefs and lor mixed 
feelings) both when they hold ambivalent attitudes and when they hold dual attitudes 
(compared to when they have no conflict). This fmding gives credit to one proposition 
presented by Priester and Petty (1996) that the feeling ofbeing conflicted (or tensed) as 
measured by subjective ambivalence might be influenced by manifest conflicting 
reactions (i.e. conflicting evaluations of which the individual is aware) above a threshold 
but below this threshold (i.e. when the conflict is unknown or denied), anticipated 
reactions might become important. Similarly, individuals holding dual attitudes might not 
be aware of their internaI conflict but they might be able to anticipate the conflicting 
reactions they would have at the moment of consumption. 
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It was also predicted that the source of ambivalent attitudes lies in a similar 
endorsement, relevance and importance of both bases of evaluation (positive and 
negative) whereas, on the contrary, dual attitudes would be based on one stronger basis of 
evaluation (the explicit attitude), which would be perceived as more important and 
relevant for the individual. Contrary to the predictions, the results show that both 
ambivalent and dual attitudes tend to involve positive and negative bases of evaluation 
that are equally endorsed and considered as important and relevant. However, the conflict 
seems to be created by a differential weighting of negative aspects between ambivalent 
and non-ambivalent, dual and non-dual. The negative basis of evaluation is more 
important and relevant for those individuals high in ambivalence (compared to low) but 
also for those holding dual attitudes over non dual ones. This fmding corroborates the 
hypothesis presented by Caccioppo, Gardner and Bemtson (1997) that attitude conflicts 
are more closely associated with the activation of negativity than positivity (i.e. the 
negativity bias). 
A second set ofhypotheses was proposing that whereas the explicit attitude is 
weaker when participants are high in ambivalence, it should not be weaker when 
participants hold dual attitudes. Indeed, the assumption was that, in order to override 
automatic and implicit drives, the explicit attitude should be strongly held and wanted, i.e. 
highly accessible, stable and held with much confidence. Study 1 corroborates the body 
of research on ambivalence demonstrating that when participants are high in ambivalence, 
their attitude is less accessible, more unstable and held with much less confidence than 
when they are low in ambivalence. Nonetheless, duality has an impact on two 
dimensions, accessibility and certainty. At high levels of ambivalence, the explicit 
attitude is even slower to retrieve when participants hold dual attitudes. Overall, this 
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implicit-explicit discrepancy seems to create additional confusion and difficulty to 
quickly express an overall evaluation. This fmding seems in line with Wilson et al.'s 
(2000) theorizing on the repression of the implicit attitude, which might involve an 
extended reaction time to express the fmal evaluation. In parallel, at high levels of 
ambivalence, the attitude is held with more certainty for dual compared to non dual 
individuals, which supports the hypothesis of an explicit attitude held with strong 
conviction, and strongly wanted over the implicit attitude. 
1.2. The interplav between implicit and explicit attitudes in predicting behavior 
The fmdings of both study 1 and 2 clearly demonstrate that deliberative behavior 
is only influenced by the explicit attitude whereas spontaneous behavior is driven by both 
the implicit and the explicit attitude (Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Perugini, 2005). In study 
1, what is even more intriguing is the moderating effect of holding dual and ambivalent 
attitudes on the influence of the implicit on spontaneous choice. The influence of the 
implicit attitude is particularly evident when participants hold dual attitudes and also 
when they are high in ambivalence. In the second study, resource capacity (through a 
cognitive load manipulation) was manipulated in order to detect differences in the 
influence of the implicit attitude on behavior. The rationale was that under high cognitive 
load, participants might be less likely to control their choice, and as a consequence, the 
implicit attitude might exert a stronger influence on their spontaneous choice. Results 
corroborate an effect of cognitive load condition on choice, with more likelihood to 
choose the high fat option when under high cognitive load. In addition, for the group that 
might experience most conflict in their choice between a high fat and a reduced fat option 
(i.e. the restrained eaters, who mostly hold positive implicit attitudes towards the high-fat 
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cookie), the implicit attitude (GNAT) toward the high fat option has a significant 
influence on choice when the group is under impairment of cognitive resources. 
AH together, these results corroborate empiricaHy Perugini (2oo5)'s hypotheses on 
the dissociation between implicit attitudes as predictors of spontaneous choice and 
explicit attitudes as predictors of deliberate choice in the context of food. Unfortunately, 
Perugini (2005) could not fully test his hypothesis due to a small sample size and 
limitations in his statistical approach (p. 38)1. These results are robust in that they 
replicate with two different choice options, one choice between two product categories 
(chocolate vs. yoghurt) and one choice between two varieties of the same product (OREO 
in its reduced fat or double crème version). Findings also c1early demonstrate that the 
role of the implicit attitude at the moment of a spontaneous choice is particularly strong in 
the case of an attitudinal conflict (i.e. dual or ambivalent attitudes) or when restrained 
eaters are less likely to control their eating behaviors. It seems that, when conflicted and 
in position of restricted cognitive capacity, individuals might rely more on their internaI 
"feelings" in a "1 do as 1 feel" type of mode. 
1.3. Implicit attitudes toward food 
A lot of research in the domain of food has found an implicit preference toward 
low fat foods over high fat foods, both in overweight or normal weight participants 
(Roefs and Janssen, 2002) or restrained and non-restrained eaters (Vartanian et al. 2004), 
contrary to researchers' predictions. For instance, Roefs and Janssen (2002) found 
counter-intuitively that people have a positive preference toward low fat food (described 
1 Perugini fits a LISREL model with a dichotomous dependent variable inappropriately, as it distorts the 
parameters and standard error terms. 
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with fruits and vegetables) over high fat food (described as junk foods). Similarly, 
Perugini (2005) in a choice between snacks (defined as cake, pastries, biscuits etc.) and 
fruits (defmed apples, bananas etc.) or Karpinski and Hilton (2004) in a choice between 
apples and candy bars found a positive implicit preference in favor of the healthier option. 
In this research, implicit attitudes are assessed on particular exemplars of food 
items (chocolate vs. yoghurt; OREO reduced fat vs. double crème) rather than on abstract 
product categories, as it focuses more on the immediate, concrete and sensorial 
representation of the food at the point of consurnption. In line with the robust fmdings on 
chocolate liking and cravings (Hetherington and Macdiarmid, 1993), participants hold an 
implicit preference in favor of chocolate over yoghurt (measured through the lAT). In 
addition, the separate assessment of the implicit attitude for chocolate vs. yoghurt 
(through the GNAT and the EAST) reveals that this preference is made up of a positive 
implicit attitude toward chocolate and a neutral attitude toward yoghurts 1• For the choice 
involving both OREO varieties, participants displayed a marked preference for the double 
crème over the reduced fat cookie (lAT), which is compounded of a positive implicit 
attitude toward the double crème and a negative implicit attitude toward the reduced fat 
(GNAT measures). It has to be noted that the choice made here was not between a high 
fat vs. a low fat product but between an enriched product (supposed more creamy, 
sweeter) over a reduced fat option. Hence, whereas high fat vs. low fat might directly 
(and only) refer to differently healthy options, enriched vs. reduced fat refers to, on one 
side, extra taste-extra fat and on the other side, lower taste-Iower fat. 
1 • In studies involving only the lAT, a positive preference toward low fat product does not necessarily 
mean the attitude toward the low fat category is positive. Results might also imply that the attitude is 
negative toward both options (or positive toward both options) and that one option is preferred over the 
other. 
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1.4. Measurement ofimplicit attitudes 
This research also helps understand better the reliability and validity of indirect 
measures of implicit attitude. Although the lAT is the most widely used procedure, many 
studies have found low internaI consistency and low test-retest reliabilities (see Cameron, 
Alvarez and Bargh, 2000). For instance, low correlations were found between the lAT 
and evaluative priming measures in several studies (Sherman, Presson, Chassin and Rose, 
1999; Fazio, 1999). Yet, the fmdings obtained in study 1 and 2 corroborate Cunningham 
et al.'s (2001)1 fmdings that indirect instruments such as the lAT are valid and display a 
good test-retest reliability. In study 2, the implicit attitude was measured at three points in 
time through the lAT and the GNAT. Results show that there is no within-subject effect 
of time on the lAT, despite experimental conditions likely to modify the implicit attitude. 
This supports the claim that the lAT is able to assess implicit attitudes with reliability 
over time. Similarly, the GNAT measures were overall stable over time and bOth 
dependent variables (sensitivity and latencies) are internally consistent. 
The interest of this research also lies in the inclusion of different measures of 
implicit attitude. Both in study 1 and 2, the fmdings for the different implicit measures go 
in the same direction, indicating a positive preference in favour of chocolate (study 1) and 
in favour of the double crème (study 2i. In addition, in study 1, the lAT correlates 
significantly with bOth the GNAT (r=O.323) and the EAST (r=O.192). Second, in study 2 
(session 2), the lAT correlates with both GNAT measures, that measuring the implicit 
1. Cunningham et al. (2001) tested the psychometrie properties of the lAT against a response-window lAT 
and a response-window evaluative priming procedure. 
2. The results for the evaluative priming task are not conclusive. It is likely that the priming was not strong 
(words rather than images) or long enough in order to be notieed. 
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attitude toward the double crème and that of reduced fat. These results indicate that the 
lAT and the GNAT overlap in what they are measuring but they do not measure the same 
construct. It appears that, whereas the lAT measures an implicit preference between the 
target and the contrast category, the GNAT is more related to an absolute evaluation 
(Nosek and Banaji, 2001). 
1.5. Inhibitive processes at play 
This research also suggests, in line with Wilson et al.'s (2000) theorizing, that dual 
attitudes result from an overriding of one response and its replacement by another 
response, endorsed and viewed as more legitimate by the individual. The empirical study 
is conducted in the context of food, and especially in the context of restrained eating, as it 
is assumed that restrained eaters who have to control heavily their diet would experience 
such inhibitive processes, in an attempt to deny themselves their impulsive (spontaneous) 
drives (Polivy, 1998). Indeed in study 1, fmdings show that restrained eaters are more 
likely to hold dual attitudes (negative toward chocolate at the explicit level but positive at 
the implicit level) whereas they are not anymore ambivalent than non restrained eaters. In 
study 2, the hypothesis that restrained eaters reinforce their explicit attitude in line with 
their goal (i.e. losing weight) and override the attitude that does not serve their goal is 
tested via a cognitive load paradigm. Results give partial credit to this hypothesis. There 
is, indeed, an increase in the influence of the implicit attitude toward the high fat cookie 
(GNAT) on choice for restrained eaters in the high load condition. This result suggests 
that when restrained eaters are not able to control their choice, the influence of the 
implicit attitude is higher. Yet, there is no difference between the high and low cognitive 
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load conditions on the influence of the implicit attitude toward the reduced fat cookie. It 
seems that inhibitive processes might only be the source of dual attitudes toward certain 
products, may be those high in emotional correlates (i.e. chocolate; favorite food). 
1.6. Changing attitudes through direct experience 
Taking into account the role played by implicit attitudes in dictating choices made 
under low control, the challenge is to change these implicit attitudes in order to reduce the 
attitude conflict, strengthen the attitude-behavior relation and be able to predict better 
behavior and consumption. In Study 2, a manipulation intended to change the attitude, 
through having a test group (half restrained and half non-restrained eaters) tasting the 
reduced fat OREO for ten days. The hypothesis was that implicit attitudes would be more 
positive with direct experience. Unfortunately, the manipulation did not result in any 
significant changes in the implicit attitude over time. Nonetheless, the manipulation 
appeared to foster the explicit attitude toward the reduced fat cookie, through reducing the 
ambivalence toward the reduced fat and increasing the confidence with which the attitude 
was held. Yet, the attitude remained overall quite negative. It can be concluded that the 
implicit attitude (at least toward food) seems difficult to change, and that the reduction of 
attitude conflicts might be easier to achieve through the strengthening of one' s explicit 
attitude. In line with this conclusion, Madon et al. (2005) found that social norms 
regarding protection from prejudice affected threat reactions on the explicit but not on the 
implicit measure. 
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2. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION 
Attitudes are one of the oldest and most studied constructs in social and consumer 
psychology. Yet, ambivalence and duality are constructs new to the (consumer) 
psychology field and little is known on the origin of these attitudinal conflicts, how they 
manifest subjectively to the individual, what the consequences are for the overall 
summary evaluation (or self-reported explicit attitude) and what the consequences are for 
subsequent behaviors. This research increases knowledge on both conflicts, and 
highlights the processes that might lead to them. It also contributes to previous work on 
the difficulty of making trade-offs and its emotional implication within the context of 
choices (Luce, Bettman and Payne, 2001) in examining the interplay between controlled 
and automatic processes in consumer decisions. This dissertation is also strongly rooted 
on Shiv and Fedorikhin (2002; 1999) research on spontaneous and controlled influences 
in the choice between an affect vs. a cognitive-based option and extend their frndings. 
When a decision is taken quickly or under impairment of cognitive resources, the implicit 
attitude influences significantly the choice which is made in its direction. Our findings 
also extend work on impulsive buying. It provides evidence for the role of implicit 
attitudes on spontaneous behaviors and the role of cognitive capacity in determining the 
influence of deliberative and automatic processes. Particularly, it explains the lack of an 
attitude-behavior link frequently reported for ambivalent attitudes and by extension any 
conflicted attitude structure. Finally, this research has implications for research on 
attitude change and persuasion as well. Direct experience is assessed as a means to 
change implicit and explicit attitude. Findings suggest that the implicit attitude (at least in 
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the domain of food) is resistant to change through direct experience. Nonetheless, conflict 
might be reduced through strengthening the explicit attitude. 
This research also contributes to the development of attitude measurement. The 
reliability and validity of implicit measures are explored via different instruments (lAT, 
EAST, GNAT) in a consumer environment, using brands as stimuli (Study 1) and two 
varieties of a branded product (OREO, Study 2). It is demonstrated that consumer 
products might be the vector of dual attitudes, and that it is possible to measure an 
implicit attitude toward consumer products in a reliable way. This result constitutes a 
methodological contribution to the development of new market research tools to 
understand consumers' attitudes and behaviors. 
Results are of particular interest to researchers and practitioners alike involved in 
changing inappropriate behaviors in domains where ambivalence or duality might be at 
play, such as health-related behaviors (i.e. unhealthy diets, condom use etc.). They 
suggest that certain populations (e.g. restrained eaters) might be more susceptible to 
attitude conflicts and might experience a related psychological discomfort. During 
periods of stress or cognitive load, these people might have more difficulties controlling 
their behaviors, and make choices which they might regret later on. 
Marketers will also find interesting conclusions for the marketing of products in a 
consumption environment. First, it is demonstrated that consumers might ho Id attitudes 
toward certain products which they are not aware of or which they deny. Self-report 
measures do not necessarily reflect the real or the full picture. Yet, these implicit 
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attitudes might be assessed with reliability through quantitative methods, whereas until 
now qualitative methods only (eg. through projective techniques) could have access to 
this hidden side of the consumer. This fmding offers the opportunity for marketers to dig 
deeper into consumers' evaluation of their products. 
Second, results suggest that spontaneous and impulsive choices might often be 
driven by the implicit attitude whereas more deliberate choices are strongly influenced by 
the explicit attitude. Hence, for products which might lead to conflicted attitudes 
(chocolate, biscuits, candies etc.), any action in the store that constraint processing 
resources or encourage immediate choices (Le. pressure of a salesperson; end- of-aisles) 
increases the likelihood that the irnplicit attitude will drive the behavior. On the contrary, 
any action in the store that would favor elaboration and deliberation (such as tasting 
sessions, presentation of information on leaflets etc.) increases the likelihood that the 
explicit attitude will drive behavior (see Shiv and Fedhorikin, 1999 for same comment). 
3. LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The conclusions of this research are made under the limitations of experiments 
conducted in controlled, hence artificial environment. To enhance ecological validity, it is 
necessary to replicate the results in the natural context of everyday decision situations. 
Nonetheless, the choice situation presented in this research represent dilemmas frequently 
encountered in everyday life. Food in particular is a domain in which very often our 
immediate and spontaneous choices are in contradiction with our intentions. Yet, it would 
be desirable to extend these fmdings to other domains, such as other health-related 
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behaviors (i.e. condom use), products/services conducting to impulsive choices (e.g. 
restaurants; gas-station) and real shopping environments. 
Additionally, although the test-retest reliability of the indirect measurements was 
demonstrated, certain limitations in the instruments have to be acknowledged, for 
instance, the lack of internaI consistency in the EAST or the low overall inter-reliability 
between measures. Nonetheless, this research (study 1) is one of the flfst to use four 
indirect measures of irnplicit attitudes. The measurement and classification of dual 
attitudes should also be improved. For the sake of this dissertation, a conservative path 
(using cluster analysis) was undertaken. Yet, since the 70's, researchers made 
extraordinary improvements in the measurement of ambivalent attitudes (Appendix 1 for 
a review). Developments in the measurement and identification of dual attitudes are 
foreseen. 
Last, the manipulation to change implicit attitudes through direct experience was 
not successful. Either the number of days (10 days) allocated to the manipulation was not 
sufficient or direct experience with the product is not an adequate means to tap into the 
implicit attitude structure and change it. It would be beneficial to conduct this experiment 
again with a manipulation involving the creation of mental imagery (see Blair et al., 
2001) or under an evaluative conditioning paradigm (see Dijksterhuis, 2004; OIson and 
Fazio, 2001; 2002). To enhance the contribution to marketers, the role of advertising in 
changing implicit attitudes should also be investigated further. BOOol and his colleagues 
(2003) already contributed strongly to this line of research by demonstrating that when 
explicit attitudes appear to have resisted persuasion, there might be hidden effects on the 
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implicit attitude. This fmding encourages research on means to persuade attitudes both at 
the implicit and explicit level. 
Overall, the results open interesting avenues for new research following the 
implicit attitude paradigm. It would be particularly interesting to continue testing 
inhibitive processes as an explanation for implicit and explicit dissociation. In this 
dissertation, it is proposed that dual attitudes lead to a response conflict when a behavior 
is instigated by one attitude and simultaneously inhibited by another attitude. Any context 
impairing cognitive processing or narrowing attentional range (e.g. stress) is likely to 
increase the likelihood that the behavior will be driven by the implicit attitude, which is 
likely to lead to psychological discomfort and negative affect. Researches would also 
benefit from the use of additional paradigms to the cognitive load one used in the context 
of this study, for instance ego-depletion manipulations involving successive acts of self-
control (Baumeister, 2002). An additional research avenue would be to assess individual 
behavioral traits that might increase the likelihood to hold dual attitudes toward a variety 
of consumer products and / or to be more driven by the implicit attitude when making 
consumer choices (e.g. impulse buying tendencies, Rook and Fisher, 1995; Consumer 
Locus of Control, Busseri, Lefcourt and Kerton, 1998). 
Researches on attitude conflict, especially under the implicit attitude paradigm, are 
in their infancy. Consumer research will benefit from researches in this domain, from a 
theoretical, methodological and practical perspective. 1 hope that this dissertation will 
motivate others to engage in research on ambivalent and dual attitudes as well as on 
unconscious processes of consumer choice. 
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APPENDIXI 
Review of indirect and ambivalence measurement techniques 
1. IMPLICIT MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 
Over the past few years, a variety of techniques have emerged to measure attitudes 
in an unobtrusive fashion. AlI these techniques have in common to assess attitudes 
without directly and verbally asking the participants. Various physioIogicaI techniques 
(facial electromyography, amygdala activation, eye blinking, cardiovascular reactivity 
etc.) have been used in order to track responses in an unbiased fashion, which will not be 
developed further in this overview (see Fazio and OIson, 2003 for a review). The most 
famous techniques based on response-Iatency measurement (i.e. Evaluative priming and 
its variants; Implicit Association Test and its variants) are reviewed hereafter. 
Evaluative priming. The evaluative priming technique has been the most popular 
previous to the introduction of the Implicit Association Test in 1998 (see Fazio et al., 
1986; 1995; Greenwald, Klinger and Liu, 1989; Draine and Greenwald, 1998). This 
technique involves the priming of words or pictures preceding the evaluation of positive 
and negative target adjectives. The assumption is that word categorization is facilitated in 
consistent trials compared to inconsistent ones i.e. responses are faster and more accurate 
when primes and adjectives have same valence compared to different valences. For 
instance, Fazio et al. (1995) used the priming of black and white faces preceding the 
evaluation of positive and negative adjectives. Black faces, relative to white faces, 
facilitated the responses to negative adjectives and interfered with responses on positive 
adjectives, suggesting an automatic negative bias toward black people. 
Implicit Association Test. The lAT is probably the most popular implicit 
measurement technique, and has been used for assessing the implicit attitude for a variety 
of different attitude objects. The procedure requires the combination of two categorization 
tasks, one for target words (e.g. black vs. white) and one for evaluative words (i.e. 
pleasant vs. unpleasant words). The difference in latency to categorize target words when 
paired with pleasant and unpleasant is an indicator of the strength of the association 
between the target words and an evaluative dimension (positive or negative). For 
instance, in its pioneering article, Greenwald et al. (1998) asks participants to categorize 
names (i.e. Latoya and Betsy) as typical of black or whites and evaluative words (e.g. joy 
and death) as pleasant or unpleasant words. The interest is on evaluating how participants 
respond when those tasks are combined via key assignments. In the critical phase of the 
experiment, one task requires participants to classify words meaning black or pleasant vs. 
white or unpleasant and another task (in counterbalanced order) requires participants to 
classify words into black or unpleasant vs. white or pleasant. Participants in this study 
found easier to associate black with unpleasant (and white with pleasant) than black with 
pleasant (and white with unpleasant), indicating an implicit attitude more negative toward 
black and more positive toward white people. 
The Go-No Go Association Task. Introduced by Nosek and Banaji (2001), the 
GNAT is an interesting variant of the lAT. The procedure is based on signal theory. 
Participants are required to respond to aIl stimuli related to the target category or an 
137 
evaluative category (i.e. signal) and do nothing in response to aIl other stimuli (i.e. noise). 
Response latencies and errors are compared between blocks where participants have to 
attend to the signaIs "target or good" and "target or bad". On the contrary to the lAT, the 
GNAT does not require the presence of a contrasting category i.e. the attitude to black 
might be assessed without reference to white. 
The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task. Introduced by De Houwer (2003), the EAST 
is an additional variant to the lAT. Participants have to categorize white words on the 
basis of their valence whereas they categorize colored words (Le. the target objects) on 
the basis of the color. The target objects are presented in two colors (e.g. blue-ish and 
green-ish) which are almost similar. Responses are facilitated when participants need to 
select the extrinsicaIly positive response (associated with positive white words) and 
colored positive words and responses when participants need to select the extrinsically 
negative response (associated with negative words) and colored negative words. Similar 
to the GNAT, the EAST does not need the introduction of a contrasting category. But an 
additional interest is that performance is not based on a comparison of performance 
between two different tasks, which eliminates confounds due to a different recoding of 
the tasks. 
2. AMBIVALENCE MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 
Ambivalence has been measured through unobtrusive (not based on subjects' 
impressions) as weIl as self-report measures (Bassili 1996). Measures of "potential 
ambivalence" (Newby-Clark, McGregor, and Zanna 2002) or "objective ambivalence" 
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(Priester and Petty 1996; 2001) involve asking participants separately about their positive 
and negative evaluations of an attitude object. In contrast, the subjective feeling of 
tension or conflict (felt ambivalence, Newby-Clark et al. 2002; subjective ambivalence, 
Priester and Petty 1996; 2001) is measured through asking directly the participants how 
tom, mixed or conflicted they feel about the attitude object or the issue. 
Objective measures. These measures require the evaluation of the positive and 
negative components of the attitude separately. First, participants are asked to consider 
only the positive aspects of the product or issue and ignore the negative aspects. They 
then rate how favorable is their evaluation toward the product or issue (e.g. 1 = not at all 
favorable 4= extremely favorable). Conversely for the negative component, participants 
are required to consider only the negative aspects of the issue and ignore the positive 
aspects, then rate how unfavorable is their attitude toward the product (e.g. 1 = not at all 
unfavorable; 4= extremely unfavorable). This method has been successfully employed by 
a large number of researchers (Armitage and Conner, 2000; Thompson et al., 1995). 
Further, these ratings are combined into an ambivalence index. Three indexes 
have been proposed in the literature so far. Katz (Katz and Hass, 1988; Hass et al., 1991) 
proposes to multiply the scores for the positive and negative components (Katz formula: 
PX N). However, if this formula reflects correctly higher levels of ambivalence when 
components are rated similarly, it is nonetheless unsatisfactory when ratings are polarized 
(Le. holding constant the weaker component, ambivalence is higher at higher levels of 
polarization for the stronger component). Jamieson formula involves calculating the 
square of the weaker component divided by the stronger component (J amieson formula: 
W2/ S). This formula does not lead to counterintuitive fmdings, yet it has been challenged 
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for its lack of conceptual underpinnings. The most popular measure of ambivalence 
remains the Griffin's (1995) which subtract the absolute difference between the two 
components to the average of the two components (Griffrn: (P + N) /2 -1 P - NI). 
Conceptually, this formula stresses that ambivalence is equal to the intensity of the 
components corrected by the dissimilarity in their magnitude (Thompson et al., 1995). 
This formula is currently used by most researchers on ambivalence (Annitage and 
Conner, 2000). 
Open-ended questions assessing separately the positive and negative components 
of the attitude have also been used (Esses, Haddock and Zanna, 1993). 
Subjective measures. These measures involve asking directly the participants 
how conflicted or tom he feels toward the issue with such questions as "1 have strong 
thoughts about it and 1 cannot make up my mind one way or the other", "1 frnd myself 
feeling tom between two sides of the issue" etc. Yet, these measures have been 
consistently shown to lack correlation with the meta-operatives indexes of ambivalence. 
When comparing the different ambivalence levels obtained through the above formula 
with the levels of ambivalence supposedly experienced by the subjects (Thompson et al., 
1995), researchers have constantly find low correlations between these measures (0.2 to 
0.4). Yet, the subjective measure of ambivalence generally mixes questions on the 
awareness of conflicting evaluations (i.e. mixed evaluations, advantages and 
disadvantages) with the feeling of tension generally associated with ambivalence (i.e. 
feeling tom, conflicted feelings, discomfort). 
140 
Soda 
sunkist 
sprite 
orangina 
schweppes 
fresca 
pepsi 
coke 
canada dry 
barqs 
Average set 5 
Waters 
source 
perrier 
montellier 
labrador 
cristalline 
naya 
montclair 
evian 
dasahi 
aquafina 
Average set 5 
Soda vs. Waters 
Mean Ass-Dissoc 
Mean fam iliarity 
APPENDIX3 
Pre-test words lAT soda vs. water 
Ass-Diss Word length Familiarity Ass soda Ass water 
-1,00 7 2,55 3,05 0,66 
-1,35 6 2,89 5,79 1,05 
-1,35 8 2,32 4,47 0,84 
-1,60 9 2,37 5,39 1,26 
-1,10 6 1,05 3,92 1,45 
-2,30 
-2,10 
-2,90 
5 2,955~95 0,66 
5 
6,60 
2,66 
0,13 
2,67 
5,68 
3,47 
5,70 
0,76 
0,45 
0,63 
Ass-Diss Word length Familiarity Ass soda Ass water 
2,15 6 1,24 0,95 3,63 
2,00 7 2,53 2,74 5,03 
1,70 10 0,29 0,68 3,95 
1,OS 8 2,47 0,63 4,OS 
0,75 11 1,92 1,03 3,24 
",. ..;:.:.::2~.~§.'·: 4 ,:2,74 <.:J~,?~ .:4,~ 
····,;.2;80 92,42 0.894,71 
;2;85 5 2,840~5Q5~50 
':2jao ..••... 62,45'Ô~66 :4,05 
'2,7S 8 2,18 O~37 4,27 
2,79 
t(19)=1,141 p=O,268 
t(37)=1,672 p=O,1 03 
6,40 2,S3 0,60 4,69 
(2,90 compared to 2,79) 
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APPENDIX4 
Pre-test words lAT chocolate bars vs. yoghurt 
Ass-Diss Word length Familiarity Ass choco Ass yogourt 
2,70 9 1,53 4,95 0,01 
2,95 4 2,55 5,68 0,13 
2,95 72,74 5;74 0;18 
2,80 8?,()3 5,46 0,16 
2,65 8 2,50 5,74 0,34 2. 0~1 
Chocolate 
Wunderbar 
Twix 
Hershey 
Crunchie 
Caramilk 
Cadbury 
Oh Henry 
iSni<;k"Éa~': .' 
Kit Kat 
Aero 
.. 2,80 .. "O!()() 
.. ~.V .• ·.~·.:. :., .• ,:,:.1 .. ~,;; .. ", ...... ,i:n:,:.>·.·.·:,,:~2·.·.'.;ft,·, •.. 'I:'·.,·, ::··~'O. ,":·1'.'6, :) \;.,~.; ~ '".:<"':":" ~
Average set 5 
Yogourts 
Yoplait 
Silhouetté 
'Minig<> .. 
'Liberty 
Danone 
Astro 
Spring valley 
Average set 5 
Chocolate vs. Yogourts 
Mean Ass-Dissoc 
Mean familiarity 
2,95 7 2,92 5,95 0,29 
2,95 4 1,63 5,32 0,50 
2,89 
Ass-Diss 
~3.00.' 
-?,50 
~gi70 
.... '2:>11\ , l~:·. 
~2.9,5 ... 
-2,40 
-0,50 
-2,71 
t(19)=1,630 p=0,119 
t(37)=0,724 p:0,474 
7,4 
5 
13 
7,2 
2,54 5,65 0,14 
Ass choco Ass yogourt 
.... "::':g~:, ::: 
't~l;t :~ 
-0,34 0,30 3,08 
0,82 0,42 1 ,00 
2,41 0,41 4,90 
(2,89 compared to 2,71) 
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APPENDIX5 
Experimental design study 1 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 
Group 1 = 1 of lAT GNAT EAST Priming Explicit questions randomized within blocks 
4 
1 
Group 2 = 2 of GNAT lAT Priming EAST Yoghurts and Chocolate 
4 counterbalanced 
Group 3 = 3 of EAST Priming lAT GNAT Positive and Negative ambivalence 
4 counterbalanced 
1 
Group 4 = 4 of Priming EAST GNAT lAT Objective and Subjective ambivalence 
4 counterbalanced 
--
APPENDIX6 
Sets of words and brands used in s-ludy 1 
Pleasant adjective set: "BEAUTIFUl", "EXCEllENT", "FRIENDlY", "FABUlOUS", 
"WONDERFUl" 
Unpleasant adjective set: "HORRIBLE", "SICKENING", "REVOl TING", "TERRIBLE", 
"DISGUSTING" 
Chocolate brands: "HERSHEY", "CADBURY", "OH HENRY", "CRUNCHIE", 
"SNICKERS" 
Yoghurt brands: "YOPLAIT", "DANONE", "LIBERTY", "SllHOUi;TTE", "MINIGO" 
APPENDIX7 
lAT sequences (pilot study and study 1) 
Sequence 1 2 3 4 5 
Task Initial Initial concept Initial combined Initial combined Reversed 
description attribute concept 
(The sequences 2,3,4 and 5,6,7 are counterbalanced tor hait subjects) 
Purpose Practice Practice 
Task E - pleasant E-CHOCO 
Instruction 
s 
unpleasant - 1 YOG-I 
Trials 10 10 
(ail attributes) (ail 10 targets) 
"---~ .. ~ ,- ~ -
Each subject has 150 trials. 
Each target word is repeated 8 times in the 
lAT. 
Practice Test Practice 
E - pleasant E- pleasant E-YOG 
E-CHOCO E-CHOCO CHOCO -1 
Unpleasant - 1 unpleasant - 1 
YOG-I YOG -1 
20 40 10 
(10 targets and (10 targetsX2 (ail 1 0 targets) 
1 0 attributes) 10 attributesX2) 
---- '-------
---_. __ .. _-~ 
6 7 
Reversed Reversed 
combined combined 
Practice Test 
E - pleasant E - pleasant 
E-YOG E-YOG 
unpleasant - 1 unpleasant - 1 
CHOCO-I CHOCO -1 
20 40 
(1 0 targets and (1 0 targets X2 
1 0 attributes) and 10 
----
attcibutes _~ 
APPENDIX8 
EAST sequences 
Sequence 1 2 3 4-5 
Task White attributes Coloured targets Mixed Mixed 
description 
(Hait the subjects have A blue and L green) 
Purpose Practice Practice Practice Test 
Task A- PLEASANT A-GREEN A- PLEASANT A- PLEASANT 
Instructions 
UNPLEASANT - L BLUE - L A- GREEN A- GREEN 
UNPLEASANT - L UNPLEASANT - L 
BLUE - L BLUE - L 
Trials 10 20 30 120 
(ail attributes) (10 targets in 2 (1 0 targets X2 (1 0 targetsX8 
colours) and 10 attributes) 10 attributesX4) 
Each subject has 180 trials. 
Each target word is repeated 12 times in the EAST (6 times in each color). 
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APPENDIX9 
GNATsequence 
Sequence 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 
Task Attributes Targets Combined GNAT Combined GNAT 
description 
Choco target Yog target 
1-4 randomized 5-8 randomized 
Purpose Practice Practice Test Test 
Signal! Noise Signal: Good Signal: Choco Signal: Choco-good Signal: Yog-good 
Noise: Bad Noise: Vog Noise: Vog-bad Noise: Choco-bad 
Signal: Bad Signal: Yog Signal: Choco-bad Signal: Yog-bad 
Noise: Good Noise: Choco Noise: Vog-good Noise: Choco-good 
Oeadlines Signal: 1000ms Signal: 1000ms Signal: 1000ms Signal: 1000ms 
Noise: 500ms Noise: 500ms Noise: 500ms Noise: 500ms 
Ratio 1:1 1:1 4:3 4:3 
signal/noise 
Trials 20 20 140 140 
(ail attributes signal) (ail target signal) (5 targets X8) (5 targets X8) 
Each subject has 352 trials. 
Each target word is repeated 14 times in the GNATs (9 times as signal and 5 times as noise). 
Each combined GNAT set of 70 trials is preceeded by a block of 8 practice trials randomized. 
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APPENDIX 10 
Screening questionnaire 
Study 1 
SUBJECT #: __ 
Sequences: I-IATWHI2 2-GNATWHI2 3-EASTWHI2 4-PRIMEWID2 5-QUESTWlD2 
Date: Time: 
What is your gender? o Male o Female 
What is your age? 
What is your occupation? 
What is your highest degree of education? 0 Secondary School 
o CEGEP 
o University (undergraduate) 
o University (graduate) 
What is your native language? 
How fluent are you in English? (please circle your rating on the scale below) 
Not at aIl fluent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely fluent 
How many years have you been living in Canada? 
Is your vision normal (or corrected to normal)? OYes 0 No 
Do you have problems discriminating colors? OYes 0 No 
Do you suffer from diabetes? 1:1 Yes 0 No 
Are you currently on a weight-reduction plan or a restrictive diet of any kind? 0 Yes 0 No 
Have you recently (within the last month) completed a weight-reduction plan or a restrictive diet of any 
kind? 0 Yes 0 No 
Do you suffer from food allergies? 0 Yes (specify ______ ) 0 No 
What is your actual height? centimeters or __ feet and ___ inches __ 
What is your actual weight? __ kilograrns or __ pounds 
How do you judge your CUITent body weight? 
Too low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Too high 
How hungry are you presently? 
Not at aIl hungry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very hungry 
How thirsty are you presently? 
Not at aIl thirsty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very thirsty 
How do you feel at the present time? 
Sad 2 3 4 5 6 7 Happy 
Negative 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive 
Unpleasant mood 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pleasant mood 
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Appendix 11 
Post-choice questionnaire 
Study 1 
Subject# __ _ 
Date: Time: ___ _ 
Choice: _____ Chocolate OR ____ Yoghurt 
1. Indicate below the basis of yOuf choice between a yoghurt in tube and a chocolate bar by circling the 
appropriate number for each of the 5 statements. 
My rmal decision about which snack to choose was driven by: 
My thoughts 2 3 4 5 6 7 My feelings 
Mydesire 2 3 4 5 6 7 My willpower 
My prudent self 2 3 4 5 6 7 My impulsive 
self 
My rational side 2 3 4 5 6 7 My emotional 
side 
Myheart 2 3 4 5 6 7 Myhead 
II. Indicate below to what extent you are hungry and thirsty at present. 
Not at aU hungry 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very hungry 
Not at aU thirsty 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very thirsty 
III. Indicate how you feel at the present time. 
Sad 2 3 4 5 6 7 Happy 
Negative 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive 
Unpleasant mood 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pleasant mood 
IV. Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the statements below by circling the 
appropriate number. 
Chocolate is an appropriate food any time of the day. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
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1 just have to have some chocolate on a regular basis. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
Dark chocolate is healthier than milk chocolate. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
1 often experience cravings for sweets. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
My food choices are often motivated by specific cravings. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Stronglyagree 
1 Most often eat chocolate when 1 am alone. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
Eating chocolate is truly pleasurable. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
1 MOst often eat chocolate when 1 feel depressed. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Stronglyagree 
1 eat chocolate because it is a good source of energy. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Stronglyagree 
1 would Iike to eat chocolate more often. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
Chocolate is a perfect food when watching movies. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
1 can't eat just one piece of chocolate. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
Food occupies an important place in my Iife. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
When 1 experience cravings for sweets, 1 fult"'l them by eating chocolate. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
1 eat chocolate because it is a convenient snack food. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
1 consider myself to he a person who eats healthy. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
1 am concerned about the consequences of what 1 eat. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
V. Indicate the extent to which each of the action tendencies below is descriptive of you by circling the 
appropriate number. 
1 enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verymuch 
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l'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems. 
Not at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
1 enjoy intellectual challenges. 
Not at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
1 try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. 
Not at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
1 don't have a very good sense of intuition. 
Not at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
1 helieve in trusting my hunches. 
Not at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
1 don't like to do a lot of thinking. 
Not at al1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verymuch 
1 like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 
Not at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verymuch 
Using my gut feelings usually works weil for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
Not at al11 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verymuch 
Intuition can he a very useful way to solve problems. 
Not at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
1 often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
1 am not very good at solving problems that require carefullogical analysis. 
Not at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
VI. Below is a list of beliefs how one can compensate for potentiaIly unhealthy behaviors such as eating too 
much or not exercising enough. Most of these beliefs have not been scientifically tested, so it is not yet 
known to which extent they are true. Please read each statement carefully. Then indicate how much truth 
you personally think there cou1d be to the belief by placing a ./ in the box besides the answer. 
It is fine to skip breakfast if one eats more during lunch. 
No truth at allQ A tiny bit of truth Q A little bit of truth Q Sorne truth Q Quite a bit of truth 
CI 
Breaking a diet today May he compensated for by starting a new diet tomorrow. 
No truth at allQ A tiny bit of truth Q A Iittle bit of truth Q Sorne truth CI Quite a bit of truth 
CI 
Using artificial sweeteners compensates for extra calories. 
No truth at ail Q A tiny bit of truth Q A liule bit of truth Q Sorne truth Q Quite a bit of truth 
CI 
Vitamin pills compensate for the bad etTects of a poor diet. 
No truth at allQ A tiny bit of truth CI A Iittle bit of truth Q Sorne truth Q Quite a bit of truth 
1:1 
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Eating sweets once in a while is fine because it reduces stress. 
No truth at ail Cl A tiny bit of truth Cl A little bit of truth Cl Sorne truth Cl Quite a bit of truth 
D 
If one exercises one can eat without many restrictions. 
No truth at ail D A tiny bit of truth Cl A little bit of truth Cl Sorne truth Cl Quite a bit of truth 
D 
Eating junk food once in a while is rme if one exercises regularly. 
No truth at ail Cl A tiny bit of truth 0 A little bit of truth Cl Sorne truth Cl Quite a bit of truth 
Cl 
Eating dessert once in a while is balanced by not sweetening one's cotTee or tea. 
No truth at ail D A tiny bit of truth 0 A little bit of truth 0 Sorne truth 0 Quite a bit of truth 
D 
If one did not eat during the entire day it is rme to eat whatever one wants in the evening. 
No truth at ail D A tiny bit of truth D A little bit of truth D Sorne truth D Quite a bit of truth 
o 
Eating a piece of cake once in a while is rme as long as one does not eat dessert regularly. 
No truth at ail 0 A tiny bit of truth 0 A little bit of truth D Sorne truth 0 Quite a bit of truth 
o 
VII. Please answer each question below by placing a ./ in the box besides the answer that most closely 
reflects yOuf own dietary habits. 
Hyou have put on weight, how often do you eat less than you usuaUy do? 
Never 0 Seldorn 0 Sornetirnes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How often do you try to eat less at mealtimes than you would Iike to eat? 
Never 0 Seldorn 0 Sornetirnes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How often do you refuse food or drinks otfered to you because you are concemed about your weight? 
Never 0 Seldorn 0 Sornetimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How often do you watch exactly what you eat? 
Never 0 Seldorn 0 Sornetirnes 0 Often 0 Veryoften 0 
How often do you deliberately eat foods that are slimming? 
Never 0 Seldorn 0 Sornetirnes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
When you have eaten too much, how often do you eat less than usual the foUowing day? 
Never 0 Seldorn 0 Sornetirnes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How often do you deliberately eat less in order not to become heavier? 
Never 0 Seldorn 0 Sornetimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How often do you try not to eat between meals because you are watching your weight? 
Never 0 Seldorn 0 Sornetirnes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
In the evenings, how often do you try not to eat because you are watching your weight? 
Never 0 Seldorn 0 Sornetirnes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How often do you take your weight into account with what you eat? 
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Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when you are irritated? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when you have nothing to do? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when you are depressed or discouraged? 
Never 0 Sel dom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when you are Ceeling lonely? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when somebody lets you down? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when you are cross? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when something unpleasant is about to happen? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How often do you get the desire to eat when you are anxious, worried or teuse? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when things are going against you or have gone wrong? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when you are Crightened? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when you are disappointed? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you have a desire to eat when you are emotionaUy upset? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How often do you have a desire to eat when you are bored or restless? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you eat more than usual when the food tastes good to you? 
Never 0 Sel dom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How often do you eat more than usual if the food smells and looks good? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
If you see or smell something delicious, how oCten do you have a desire to eat it? 
Never 0 Seldom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
If you have something delicious to eat, how oCten do you eat it straight away? 
Never 0 Sel dom 0 Sometimes 0 Often 0 Very often 0 
How oCten do you also want to eat when you see others eating? 
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Never Cl Sel dom Cl Sometimes Cl Often Cl Very often Cl 
How orten do you eat more than usual when you see others eating? 
Never Cl Seldom Cl Sometimes Cl Often Cl Very often Cl 
How orten are you inclined to eat something when preparing a meal? 
Never Cl Sel dom Cl Sometimes Cl Often Cl Very often Cl 
If you walk past the baker, how orten do you have the desire to buy something delicious? 
Never Cl Sel dom Cl Sometimes Cl Often Cl Very often Cl 
If you walk past a snackbar or a café, how often do you have the desire to buy something 
delicious? 
Never Cl Sel dom Cl Sometimes Cl Often Cl Very often Cl 
How often can you resist eating delicious food? 
Never Cl Sel dom Cl Sometimes [J Often [J Very often [J 
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APPENDIX13 
Informed Consent Form 
The purpose of an informed consent is to ensure that you understand the purpose of the study and the 
1Ulture ofyour involvement. The informed consent has to provide sufficient information such that you have 
the opportunity to determine whether you wish to participate in the study. 
Study TitIe: The influence of mental tasks in food taste perceptions 
Study Personnel: Marie-Cécile Cervellon (PhD Candidate, Principal Investigator, 
tel. 3984000 ext. 00834), m-cecile.cervellon@mail.mcgill.ca 
Pr. Laurette Dubé (Faculty of Management Investigator) 
Ifyou have any ethical concems about this study, please contact Ms. Lynda McNeil (514-398-6831), 
McGill University Research Ethics Officer for Human subjects. 
Purpose and task requirement: The purpose of this study is to assess how mental tasks might affect the 
perception of the taste of food products with low fat or high fat content. The main product under 
consideration is OREO COOKIES and two varieties, reduced-fat and double crème. First, a series of tasks 
will be administered on computer. Instructions will be given directly on the computer sereen. The tasks 
require that you go as fast as possible and at the same times make the fewer errors. At the end, you will 
have a taste session. If you do not want to taste any of the products presented to you, please feel free to tell 
the experimenter. The whole study should take an hour approximately to complete. 
At the end of this frrst session, you will be given short questionnaires to be filled out during the next 10 
days and we will fix an appointment for the second session, which will be shorter (approx. 20 minutes). 
Potential risk: As food will be tasted ail along the experiment, please do not participate if you have food 
allergies of any type. 
Anonymity and confidentiality: We are not interested in identifying who you are in our database of 
results. In the computer database, you will be identified with an ID number which will be allocated to you 
at the end of this informed consent form. The data collected in this study will be kept confidential and used 
only by the investigator for her personaI research purposes and publications. 
Right to Witbdraw: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. At any point during the study 
you have the right not to complete certain questions. You have also the right to withdraw at any time. Yet, 
the $25 compensation will only be received upon full completion of the two sessions. 
1 have read the above description of the study conceming taste perceptions in following mental tasks. My 
sig1Ulture indicates that 1 agree to participate in the study, and this in no way constitutes a waiver of my 
rights. 
Full name (please print): 
Code allocated: 
Participant Signature: 
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APPENDIX 14 
Pre-test words Reduced fat vs. Double Crème OREO (study 2) 
aspartam 
saccharin 
sweeteners 
restrailt 
sugar 
full 
rich 
sweet 
taste 
carboh~rate 
cream 
treat 
indulgence 
Mean Ass-Dissoc 
Meanfam 
8 1.70 0.40 
9 1.90 0.15 
10 2.35 0.35 
9 1.80 0.75 
5 2.95 -1.05 
4 2.70 -1.15 
4 2,85 -1.55 
5 2.85 -0.95 
5 2275 -1.50 
12 2.35 -0.70 
5 ~.60 .;1.8> 
.. 
5 
.. 
2.75 -1.25 
10 2.65 -1.50 
btw both word sets: 
t(19)=O.092 p=O,928 
APPENDIX15 
Phone Pre-screening questionnaire 
Study2 
The consumer behavioUf laboratory of McGiII University is recruiting FEMALE participants for a study on 
''THE INFLUENCE OF MENTAL ACI'lVlTIES ON T ASTE PERCEPTION". This study is composed of two 
sessions. DUfing the fust session, participants will complete a series of tasks on a computer and will taste a 
series of food items. Maximum time for this session is half-an-hoUf. Afterwards, every day for 10 days, 
participants will fùl out a short one-page questionnaire on their activities during the day. Last, a second 
session will involve an additional task on a computer and another tasting session for another 30 minutes. AlI 
sessions will take place at McGiII University, Faculty of Management, Bronfman Building, 3rd floor, in 
XXXXX 2004. Participants will receive $25 compensation to participate in the two-session study. 
Participation is voluntary. YOuf personal identification will only be used to contact you. AIl information 
included in this questionnaire will be kept confidential. 
YOuf fust and last name: 
YOuf phone number: OR yOuf e-mail address: 
What is yOuf age? 
What is yOuf occupation? 
What is yOuf native language? 
How fluent are you in English? (please circle yOuf rating on the scale below) 
Not at aIl fluent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely fluent 
How many years have you been living in Canada? ______ _ 
Is yOuf vision normal (or corrected to normaI)? OYes 0 No 
Do you suffer from diabetes? OYes 0 No 
Do you suffer from food allergies? 0 Yes (please specify ______ ) 0 No 
What is yOuf actual height? centimeters or __ feet and ___ inches 
What is yOuf actual weight? __ kilograms or __ pounds 
Do you know the brand of cookies OREO? OYes 0 No 
Do you know the variety Reduced Fat OREO cookies? OYes 0 No 
Do you know the variety Double Crème OREO cookies? OYes 0 No 
How often are you dieting? 
00 Never 10 Rarely 20 Sometimes 30 Often 4CJ AIways 
What is the maximum amount of weight that you have ever lost within one month? 
160 
about kg or lbs. 
00 0-41bs 10 5-91bs 20 10-141bs 30 15-19 lbs 40 20+ 
What is your maximum weight gain within a week? 
about kg or lbs. 
00 0-1 lbs 10 1.1-21bs 20 2.1-3 lbs 30 3.1-5 lbs 40 5.1+ 
In a typical week, how much does your weight fluctuate? 
about kg or lbs. 
00 0-1 lbs 10 1.1-21bs 20 2.1-3 lbs 30 3.1-5 lbs 40 5.1+ 
Would a weight fluctuation of 51b (or 2.2kg) affect the way you live your life? 
00 Not at aIl 10 slightly 20 moderately 30 very much 
Do you eat sensibly in front of others and splurge alone? 
00 Never 1 [J rarely 20 often 30 al ways 
Do you give too much time and thought to food? 
00 Never 10 rarely 20 often 30 always 
Do you have feelings of guilt after overeating? 
00 Never 1 0 rarely 20 often 30 al ways 
How conscious are you of what you are eating? 
00 Not at all 10 slightly 20 moderately 30 extremely 
How many pounds over your desired weight were you at your maximum weight? 
about kg or lbs. 
00 0-1 lbs ID 2-5 lbs 20 6-10 lbs 30 11-20 lbs 40 21+ lbs 
IF ABOVE 16: RESTRAINED GROUP 1 
IF 15 AND BELOW: NON RESTRAINED GROUP 2 
If possible: no eating for an hour before coming to sessions 
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1 Subject# 
Date: Time: 
APPENDIX16 
Post-cnoice questionnaire ( study 2) 
L YOUR CHOICE OF COOKIES 
1. You just made a choice between two varieties of OREO cookies. Please indicate below 
yOuf choice: 
2. Write down everything that came to yOuf mind while you were making yOuf choice: 
3. Indicate below the basis of yOuf choice by circling the appropriate number for each of 
the 5 items below. 
My fmal decision about which cookies to choose was driven by: 
My thoughts 2 3 4 5 6 7 My feelings 
My desire 2 3 4 5 6 7 My willpower 
My prudent self 2 3 4 5 6 7 My impulsive self 
My rational side 2 3 4 5 6 7 My emotional side 
My heart 2 3 4 5 6 7 Myhead 
4. Indicate below to what extent you are hungry and thirsty at present. 
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Not at ail hungry 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very hungry 
Not at all thirsty 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very thirsty 
II. COOKIE TASTE RATINGS 
1. Taste perception: 
ln front of you are 2 bowls, each with a different type of cookies. You are asked to evaluate the 
taste of each type of cookies. Make sure that you taste enough of each type of cookies to be 
clearly able to evaluate their taste. 
Please start by tasting the cookies from the left bowl (A). Make the ratings for this type of cookie, 
and then proceed to the cookies from the right bowl (B). Please do not change any of your ratings 
once you have completed the task. 
Left bowl, A -
Please read each statement carefully and indicate to what extent you think that this type of cookie 
possesses the following tasting properties by choosing the numbers that best correspond to your 
answers. 
Not at aIl sweet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very sweet 
Not at aIl rich 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Veryrich 
Not at all chewy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verychewy 
Not at all flavourful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very flavourful 
Not at aIl fat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very fat 
Not at all tasty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very tasty 
Not at all bland 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verybland 
How much did you like this variety of OREO cookies? 
Did not like at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Liked very 
much 
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To which extent did you experience the following feelings when eating those cookies? 
Not at aIl guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very guilty 
Not at aU at ease 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very at ease 
Not at aIl faulty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very faulty 
Not at aIl ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very 
ashamed 
Right bowl, B -
Please read each statement carefully and indicate to what extent you think that this type of cookie 
possesses the following tasting properties by choosing the numbers that best correspond to yOUf 
answers. 
Not at all sweet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very sweet 
Not at ail rich 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very rich 
Not at all chewy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verychewy 
Not at aIl flavourful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very flavourful 
Not at all fat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very fat 
Not at all tasty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very tasty 
Not at aIl bland 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verybland 
How much did you like this variety of ORBO cookies? 
Did not like at aIl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Liked very 
much 
To which extent did you experience the following feelings when eating those cookies? 
Not at aIl guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very guilty 
Not at ease 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very at ease 
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Not at all faulty 
Not at all ashamed 
1 
1 
EXPERIMENTER'S COMMENTS: 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
7 Very faulty 
7 Very ashamed 
XXXXXXXXX Indicate number of cookies left in the bowl XXXXXX 
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APPENDIX17 
Repeated tasting questionnaire 
Study 2 
Subject # ____ Date session 1: _____ ,Appointment session 2: ___ _ 
Type of cookies: 
This questionnaire has to be filled out every day, starting the next day after your 1 st 
session in the laboratory. Please try to eat ~ of the cookies we gave you, every day 
at the same time. 
Day 1: Today's Date: ____ _ Time right now: 
How much did you engage into mental tasks today? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verymuch 
How many cookies (all kind) did you eat today in total? _________ _ 
How many were OREO cookies? ___________ _ 
Before eating the cookie, indicate to what extent you are hungry 
Not at aIl hungry 
hungry 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very 
AFrER YOU A TE THE COOKIE, PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 
Please read each statement carefully and indicate to what extent you think that this type of 
cookie possesses the following tasting properties by choosing the numbers that best correspond 
to your answers. 
Not at aIl fat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very fat 
Not at aIl tasty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very tasty 
Not at all bland 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very bland 
How much did you like this cookie? 
Did not like at aB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Liked very 
much 
To which extent did you experience the foIlowing feelings when eating those cookies? 
Not at an guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very guilty 
Not at aIl at bored 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very bored 
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